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Preface
The Air Force uses thousands of different items to support its air-
craft. Most of these seldom need replacement. In fact, of the nearly 
60,000 different items identified in an analysis of annual requisitions 
of weapon system components, nearly three in four had no more than 
a half-dozen annual requisitions. But just as difficulties obtaining more 
frequently ordered parts can affect aircraft availability, so can difficul-
ties obtaining low-demand parts. Furthermore, managing such parts 
can be more difficult and expensive on average. For example, their unit 
costs are often higher because of such fixed costs as physical plants, 
manufacturing and repair equipment, and because overhead is appor-
tioned over a smaller total quantity of parts.
This monograph reviews Air Force purchases of “low-demand” 
parts, analyzing how much the Air Force spends on low-demand parts 
and the types of parts that have a low demand. It then identifies and 
synthesizes best commercial purchasing and supply chain manage-
ment practices used for developing supply strategies for such items. 
Finally, the monograph recommends how the Air Force could improve 
its supply strategies for such items.
This research was part of a study on “Best Practices for Purchas-
ing and Supply Chain Management: Developing Effective Market 
Research Methods and Proactive Supply Strategies for Low-Demand 
Items,” sponsored by the Director of Transformation, Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Logistics, Installations, and Mission Support, Headquarters 
U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. (AF/A4I), and the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Contracting, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air 
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Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQC). It was conducted in the Resource 
Management Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE.
This monograph should be of interest to anyone interested in pur-
chasing and supply chain management for the Department of Defense, 
particularly for the air logistics centers and the Defense Logistics 
Agency. This research may assist Commodity Councils of the Air Force 
Materiel Command in exercising their commandwide responsibilities 
for developing supply strategies for selected groups of commodities and 
weapon system acquisition program offices and life-cycle managers.
Related work for the Air Force has been documented in
• Jeremy Arkes and Mary E. Chenoweth, Estimating the Benefits of 
the Air Force Purchasing and Supply Chain Management Initiative, 
Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-584-AF, 2007
• Nancy Y. Moore, Clifford A. Grammich, and Robert Bickel, 
Developing Tailored Supply Strategies, Santa Monica, Calif.: 
RAND Corporation, MG-572-AF, 2007
• Nancy Nicosia and Nancy Y. Moore, Implementing Purchasing 
and Supply Chain Management: Best Practices in Market Research, 
Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-473-AF, 2006
• Mary E. Chenoweth and Clifford A. Grammich, F100 Engine 
Purchasing and Supply Chain Management Demonstration: Find-
ings from Air Force Spend Analyses, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND 
Corporation, MG-424-AF, 2006
• Lloyd Dixon, Chad Shirley, Laura H. Baldwin, John A. Ausink, 
and Nancy F. Campbell, An Assessment of Air Force Data on Con-
tract Expenditures, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 
MG-274-AF, 2005
• Nancy Y. Moore, Cynthia R. Cook, Clifford A. Grammich, and 
Charles Lindenblatt, Using a Spend Analysis to Help Identify Pro-
spective Air Force Purchasing and Supply Management Initiatives: 
Summary of Selected Findings, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Cor-
poration, DB-434-AF, 2004
• Nancy Y. Moore, Laura H. Baldwin, Frank Camm, and Cynthia 
R. Cook, Implementing Best Purchasing and Supply Management 
Preface    v
Practices: Lessons from Innovative Commercial Firms, Santa Monica, 
Calif.: RAND Corporation, DB-334-AF, 2002
• Laura H. Baldwin, Frank Camm, and Nancy Y. Moore, Federal 
Contract Bundling: A Framework for Making and Justifying Deci-
sions for Purchased Services, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corpo-
ration, MR-1224-AF, 2001
• Laura H. Baldwin, Frank Camm, and Nancy Y. Moore, Strategic 
Sourcing: Measuring and Managing Performance, Santa Monica, 
Calif.: RAND Corporation, DB-287-AF, 2000.
RAND Project AIR FORCE
RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Cor-
poration, is the U.S. Air Force’s federally funded research and devel-
opment center for studies and analyses. PAF provides the Air Force 
with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the devel-
opment, employment, combat readiness, and support of current and 
future aerospace forces. Research is conducted in four programs: Force 
Modernization and Employment; Manpower, Personnel, and Train-
ing; Resource Management; and Strategy and Doctrine.
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The Air Force uses thousands of parts to maintain its aircraft. While 
some of these are replaced quite often, most of them, in fact, are needed 
infrequently. Of nearly 60,000 items the Air Force requisitioned in a 
recent three-year period, nearly three in four had no more than a half-
dozen annual requisitions.
Difficulties in developing effective supply strategies for these 
“low-demand” parts can cause problems in maintaining aircraft just 
as problems in purchasing and supply chain management for more fre-
quently used parts can. In fact, the unpredictability of needs for low-
demand parts, as well as the difficulties in attaining them from sup-
pliers who find them less lucrative to produce than more commonly 
used parts, can mean that they pose even more challenges for Air Force 
operations than do parts with higher demands. Low-demand parts also 
pose challenges to Air Force purchasing and supply chain management 
goals, such as those for reducing sourcing cycle time, improving supply 
material availability, and decreasing material purchase and repair costs, 
particularly when low-demand parts are used by larger, more expensive 
parts and assemblies.
To assess how the Air Force could improve its development of 
supply strategies for low-demand parts, we performed three tasks. First, 
we reviewed business, academic, and defense literature on best prac-
tices for developing supply strategies for low-demand parts. Second, 
we analyzed spend data on these parts, including some indicators of 
which low-demand parts may affect mission capability for aircraft or 
incidents of awaiting parts. Third, we interviewed representatives of 
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leading commercial firms regarding their best practices for develop-
ing supply strategies for these kinds of parts. Below we discuss data on 
low-demand parts used by the Air Force, best commercial practices for 
obtaining these parts from private-sector suppliers, and their applica-
bility to the Air Force.
Low-Demand Parts in the Air Force
We defined low-demand parts as those that had no more than six aver-
age annual requisitions. In our interviews with commercial companies, 
we found that frequency of requisition was both the most common 
criterion for determining whether a part was “low-demand” and the 
variable of greatest concern to managing “low-demand” issues.
We found that Air Force low-demand parts are concentrated in 
relatively few classes of goods. Nearly two-thirds are in just five federal 
supply groups, and nearly one-third are in the federal supply group 
for electric and electronic equipment components. Air logistics centers 
rather than Air Force bases are the most frequent users of low-demand 
items. Nearly one-half of the requisitions for low-demand items origi-
nated at the Warner Robins, Oklahoma City, or Ogden Air Logistics 
Centers. This suggests that much improvement may result from initia-
tives focused on a select group of items at a small number of locations. 
Spend data on low-demand items also indicate some additional 
commodities warranting attention. Most of the dollars the Air Force 
spends on low-demand items are for items that are in the same classes 
as items that consume most of the Air Force’s dollars. For example, 
engines, turbines, and components form the federal supply group in 
which the Air Force spends both the most money overall for spare and 
repair items and the most money for low-demand items. Many leading 
suppliers of low-demand items are also leading suppliers of all spare 
and repair items to the Air Force. Of the top ten suppliers to the Air 
Force, eight are also among the top ten suppliers of low-demand items. 
This indicates that many of the suppliers with which the Air Force 
should implement overall supply strategies are the same as those with 
which it should address supply strategies for low-demand items. The 
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relatively greater proportion of low-demand items that are currently 
purchased through purchase orders rather than contracts compared to 
non-low-demand items indicates that such items are less likely to have 
supply strategies already in place for them.
Requisition data was used to define low-demand parts as any-
thing that had six or fewer demand occurrences per year. The match 
rate between the requisition and “mission capable” (MICAP) and 
awaiting parts (AWP) data was very low, which meant low-demand 
status of MICAP and AWP parts could not be based on requisition 
data. To assess the extent to which such supply availability problems 
for MICAP and AWP parts were attributable to low-demand parts, we 
considered as low-demand parts insurance (INS) items with no pro-
jected demands and nonstockage objective (NSO) items with very low 
projected demands. We found that of all items associated with MICAP 
or AWP incidents, one in four were INS or NSO items, and of all 
MICAP or AWP incidents, about one in fourteen incidents involved 
an INS or NSO item.
Best Practices for Developing Supply Strategies for  
Low-Demand Items
Where a product is in its life cycle determines to a large degree the best 
practices that are available to assure the supply of low-demand parts for 
it. Our interviewees outlined strategies for ensuring supply during the 
three life-cycle phases of design, production, and postproduction. The 
best options for ensuring long-term aftermarket support are best put in 
place in the earliest stages of a product’s life cycle.
The first, design, phase of a product’s life cycle can offer the most 
opportunities for minimizing the total number of low-demand parts. 
Involving buyers and suppliers in the design of new systems, products, 
and parts can help balance performance and cost objectives while min-
imizing unique parts to a specific product. Reducing complexity by 
using common subsystems and parts can also help minimize unique 
parts and hence the ultimate number of parts that may have only low 
demands. Monitoring and managing obsolescence through a product’s 
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life cycle can help avoid the need to replace parts that manufacturers or 
suppliers might discontinue.
The second, production, phase is the best time to align supplier 
incentives with goals for long-term support. In fact, buyers’ leverage 
over suppliers peaks just before award of the production contract. 
Committing suppliers to postproduction aftermarket services in the 
production contract can help ensure long-term support of low-demand 
parts throughout the life cycle of a product. Buyers may also want to 
leverage the production contract award to ensure potential access to 
technical data for low-demand parts, which can help it develop alterna-
tive sources of supply should the original supplier exit the business or 
prove to be unresponsive.
The third, postproduction, phase offers fewer good options for 
developing supply strategies. Buyers seeking to ensure supply of low-
demand parts may wish to provide incentives for supply of low-demand 
parts so as to maintain continuity in the supply chain. If a supplier has 
left the business, buyers may choose to develop a new one. Buyers may 
also choose to buy a lifetime supply of parts before a supplier exits a 
business, although it can be difficult to estimate the quantities needed 
for a “lifetime” supply. Finally, buyers may purchase or retire whole 
products to cannibalize low-demand (and other) parts on them.
Options for the Air Force
Just as best practices for supply strategies regarding low-demand parts 
depend on where a product is in its life cycle, so do the options avail-
able to the Air Force. In assessing supply strategies for low-demand 
parts, the Air Force must also consider many conditions that differ 
from those in the private sector, including the presence of fewer sup-
pliers and hence of alternative sources of supply. We offer the following 
recommendations.
In the design phase of a product, the Air Force should encourage 
active participation of sustainment personnel who are able to incorpo-
rate reliability and maintainability concerns (see pp. 37–38, 44–45, 58, 
60–61, 65, 72). These personnel could work more effectively with acqui-
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sition personnel to plan for long-term parts support and help ensure 
greater consideration for supply chain issues throughout a product’s life 
cycle.
Having the production contract include language that requires 
the supplier to provide long-term support can help align supplier incen-
tives with Air Force goals and make commitment to them more likely 
to be honored (see pp. 28–29, 44–45, 58, 64–65, 71–72). The Air Force 
should work with suppliers to put in place strategies for low-demand 
parts support during production, when problems are easier to address 
than they are in postproduction, when lower-tier suppliers may quit 
the business (see pp. 35–36, 38–39, 45–46, 58, 62, 66–67, 72–73). 
During production, the Air Force should also seek access or an agree-
ment to possibly access technical data for parts that would help it find 
alternative sources of supply if necessary after production ends (see pp. 
43–44, 48–50, 58, 72).1
Air Force options for support and supply strategies following pro-
duction are limited. The Air Force could analyze its low-demand parts 
to determine groups of parts that ought to be purchased together to 
make support of them more attractive to suppliers (see pp. 53–55, 58, 
66–69, 73). In some cases, the Air Force may benefit from working 
with other buyers, such as the Navy or Army, in exercising leverage 
over suppliers to improve support for low-demand parts (see pp. 52, 
67–68, 74). 
The Air Force operates many legacy aircraft, which means that 
most of its fleet is postproduction and thus facing technology obsoles-
cence, diminishing sources of supply and repair, and more low-demand 
failures than younger fleets. Few systems are still in the preaward phase 
(e.g., the replacement tanker). However, many subsystems continue to 
be modernized and upgraded. To the extent that these programs are 
competed, opportunities exist to apply some of these principles even to 
legacy aircraft (see pp. 39–42, 58, 61–62, 71, 73–74).
1 Total Life Cycle Cost Systems Management, which requires that sustainment costs be 
considered more explicitly in the production phase of the acquisition of a weapon system, 
could make the buying of technical data more likely than in the recent past. Programs often 
reallocate monies earmarked for technical data to cover cost overruns during development 
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The Air Force uses thousands of service parts to maintain its aircraft. 
It uses these items to replace those removed from fielded aircraft or 
equipment when they fail or are scheduled to be removed because of 
the time or extent of their usage. For parts that are routinely removed 
and replaced, the Air Force stocks an inventory capable of meeting 
most demands. Several recent initiatives have sought to improve pur-
chasing and supply chain management of the parts in greatest demand 
accounting for most dollars spent and having the greatest effect on 
replacement and repairs.
The Air Force is similar to many private enterprises in that while it 
uses thousands of different parts, most of them are needed infrequently. 
Of nearly 60,000 items the Air Force requisitioned between fiscal year 
(FY) 2002 and FY 2004, nearly three in four had no more than a half-
dozen annual requisitions, indicating low demand for them.1 
Nevertheless, difficulties in managing these “low-demand” parts 
can affect operations just as difficulties in attaining more frequently 
ordered parts can.2 Difficulties in managing the supply of low-demand 
1 Most Air Force–managed parts have no demands in a given year. From FY 2006 to FY 
2008, only about 37 percent of the National Item Identification Numbers (NIINs) in the 
D200 database used to forecast requirements had demands. (On average, 43,873 different 
NIINs were ordered each year compared to the average 120,184 NIINs in the D200 database.) 
These dormant parts can arise from variable demands with low-demand items. Data sources: 
Requisition data extracted from the Strategic Sourcing Analysis Tool, Global Combat Support 
System–Air Force, and D041 USAF Recoverable Spares Data Base, March of each year.
2 In the private sector, “low-demand” parts can also be called “slow-moving,” “non-routine,” 
or “unscheduled.”
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parts led the Director of Transformation, Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Logistics, Installations, and Mission Support, Headquarters U.S. Air 
Force, Washington, D.C. (AF/A4I), and the Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary for Contracting, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air 
Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQC) to ask RAND Project AIR FORCE 
to identify best practices used by companies in developing supply 
strategies for purchasing low-demand parts in cost-effective and effi-
cient ways. At the time of this study, Air Force commodity councils 
were developing supply strategies for the bulk of their demands, i.e., 
items with high to medium demands. Best practices for these kinds 
of items were well-established in the private sector. Taking root in the 
private sector were best practices in developing supply strategies for 
low-demand items. This interest was fueled in part by a shift toward 
performance-based services, in which suppliers were paid for keeping 
equipment running rather than individual repairs and spares.3 Once 
suppliers were accountable for delivering equipment performance 
rather than parts, then any part that caused equipment to stop operat-
ing needed to be supported, including low-demand items.
Difficulties in managing low-demand parts can affect both 
specific aircraft operations as well as more general management of 
resources. The C-5 cargo aircraft provides one example of the impact 
that low-demand parts availability can have on readiness. An Air Force 
Materiel Command (AFMC) analysis found that 76 percent of the 
items considered as mission capable (MICAP) drivers (either in the top 
20 percent of MICAP hours or incidents) were those with fewer than 
ten demands per year. This same analysis found that low-demand parts 
made up about 80 percent of all C-5 parts and 90 percent of C-5 repa-
rable parts in demand forecasting models.4 The difficulties in stock-
3 In 2002 about 40 percent of the $10.6 billion in sales for GE Aircraft Engines was engine 
parts and services and as much as two-thirds of its $2.1 billion in operating profit (Siekman, 
2002). An early example of the paradigm shift from buying repairs and spares from vendors 
to services is Intel and its Supplier Support Program, which paid suppliers more if their 
equipment operated past set targets (Morgan, 1995).
4 Of all parts needed to restore MICAP status for the C-5, 54 percent had no field stock 
levels. As a result, when parts failed at locations with no stock, MICAP incidents resulted if 
parts could not be repaired locally and quickly returned to the aircraft. MICAP incidents 
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ing and managing low-demand parts contributed to mission capable 
rates of only about 60 percent for this aircraft (AFMC, 2001; Warner 
Robins Air Logistics Center, 2000).
Low-demand parts are less likely to be stocked in base supply, 
which means when needed they must first be ordered or requisitioned 
from a wholesale supply source such as an Air Logistics Center (ALC) 
or the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). Low-demand parts can delay 
repairs of other, larger components at the intermediate or depot level if 
a particular part needed in the repair process is not stocked or available.
Low-demand parts can also pose higher costs in purchasing and 
supply chain management. Like all parts, low-demand items carry at 
least two types of cost: the direct procurement or manufacturing cost 
and a potential accounting cost for material that does not move. Low-
demand parts that are stocked typically remain in inventory longer than 
parts with higher demand, leading to relatively higher total unit costs 
as fixed costs such as warehousing, distribution, and labor are appor-
tioned over a smaller total quantity of parts. Because their demands are 
sporadic, low, and unpredictable, low-demand items that are stocked 
may also generate revenues slowly over long periods of time. This can 
understandably lead buyers to stock fewer low-demand parts—which 
in turn can lead to availability problems when such parts do fail.
These problems are even more complicated for the Air Force. As 
the costs of aircraft have increased over time and other budget priorities 
have emerged, the Air Force has kept its older weapon systems flying 
longer than their original design lives. As systems age, more parts fail 
for the first time, many with old or obsolete technologies, increasing 
the population of low-demand parts. Among aircraft systems with an 
average age of at least 35 years, for example, are the C-5, the T-38, and 
the B-52, which have been operating since the 1950s and have been 
extensively modified over the years. Figure 1.1 shows the age distribu-
tion of many of the Air Force’s major types of aircraft. By contrast, the 
average fleet age of U.S. airlines is 10.4 years (AirSafe.com, 2009).
also occurred if these failed parts were replaceable but not reparable. Only 4 percent of items 
accounting for the most MICAP incidents were insurance or nonstockage objective items for 
which probabilities of failure are considered to be zero or very low.
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Many subsystems continue to be modernized and upgraded. New 
equipment and aircraft that are added to the fleet before older aircraft 
have been retired are giving the Air Force more parts in general and 
more low-demand parts in particular to manage. In addition, many 
subsystems on existing aircraft that are modernized and upgraded to 
provide improved capabilities or improved maintainability and cost can 
change fleet configurations, which means that the mix and number 
of parts on them expand. Spiral development of new weapon systems, 
such as unmanned aerial vehicles, also introduces more varied parts as 
designs evolve throughout the production period (Drew et al., 2005). 
Configuration differences across individual tail numbers for an aircraft 
type tend to increase the number of low-demand parts for such systems.
Cost and availability problems for low-demand parts pose chal-
lenges for the aggressive goals of the Air Force to improve its purchasing 
and supply chain management. AFMC, through the Air Force Global 
Logistics Command (AFGLSC) and its subordinate wings, has set a 
number of goals to achieve over the period September 2008 to September
Figure 1.1 
Age Distribution of Types of Air Force Aircraft
SOURCE: Logistics, Installations and Mission Support, Weapon Systems, Inventory, 
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2011, including a 5-percent reduction in total AFGLSC-managed inven-
tory, improved support availability goals that increase annually, 30-percent 
improvement in parts availability, 50-percent reduction in contract admin-
istrative lead time, and 10-percent reduction in production lead time.5
Supply strategies that are shaped by proactive assessments of 
requirements by dimensions such as risk, strategic importance to the 
organization, and ease of substitution can help the management of 
low-demand parts. Supply strategies are based on broad, interrelated 
concerns of the organization, and they are guided by the strategic mis-
sions, goals, and objectives of the organization. For example, a supply 
strategy could be a plan for purchasing a particular group of require-
ments for ten to fifteen years after production.
Supply strategies consider the historical demands of a like group 
of requirements, their projected demands, their relative importance to 
the organization, and potential suppliers. They consider the end-to-end 
supply chain and go beyond the immediate supplier. For example, if 
the source of supply is a distributor, a supply strategy would also con-
sider the relationship between the distributor and the original equip-
ment manufacturer. It may also encompass upstream supply chains to 
include critical commodities or parts suppliers.
Developing proactive supply strategies for low-demand parts can 
help AFMC achieve its purchasing and supply chain management goals 
of supporting the Air Force in achieving its own goals to increase air-
craft availability and reduce total costs. Developing sources of supply 
and repair for low-demand requirements before part demands are gen-
erated should reduce order-fulfillment time. That is, supply strategies 
should reduce the time needed to find, source, order, receive, and ship 
the part to the customer, thereby increasing the chance that when the 
part is needed a base or depot can provide it quickly. Working with 
suppliers proactively should also reduce material purchase and repair 
costs as long as the supplier has incentives to maintain the necessary 
resources to provide support and do so at a minimum total cost.
5 The period of performance is 1,000 days, which began September 2008 and ends Septem-
ber 2011. These goals map to the AFGLSC Campaign Plan, which aligns with Air Force and 
AFMC goals and priorities. See AFGLSC (2010) and McCoy et al. (2010). 
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In this monograph, we consider possible supply strategies for Air 
Force management of low-demand parts. While supply chain manage-
ment, supply chain performance, and inventory policies are important 
for these kinds of parts, the aim of this study was to look “upstream” 
at improvements in the ways that commercial firms and the Air Force 
acquire low-demand parts from their suppliers. To do this, in the next 
section we consider the general characteristics of low-demand parts.
Defining “Low-Demand” Service Parts
We began this research by reviewing the business, academic, and 
defense literatures on best practices for developing supply strategies for 
low-demand parts.6 We found few studies that focused on low-demand 
service parts and still fewer that describe best purchasing and supply 
management practices for them. Most of the literature we cite comes 
from purchasing and supply management publications and material 
adapted from other, similar RAND studies (Moore et al., 2002). The 
literature review and commercial aftermarket services conferences 
helped us identify companies actively trying to improve the purchasing 
and supply management of their low-demand service parts.
In both our literature review and interviews with Air Force and 
commercial firm personnel, we found no universally accepted defini-
tion of a low-demand part. Three groups of personnel who play a role 
with managing such parts say they use different methods for identify-
ing items with low demands.
Inventory and AFMC production management specialists prefer 
using the identifiers INS (insurance) or NSO (nonstockage objective) 
to characterize low-demand items. AFMC identifies INS items as those 
with no projected probabilities of failure but which, if failing or dam-
aged, would require an urgent replacement to restore an aircraft to 
mission capability. A cockpit windshield is an example of an insurance 
part. AFMC identifies NSO essential items as those with very low, spo-
radic demands or with probabilities of failure so low they often have 
6 Many private firms refer to such parts as “slow moving,” “non-routine,” or “unscheduled.” 
The reader should consider the term “low-demand parts” to be synonymous with such parts.
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failure forecasts of zero. Rather than having zero stock because of very 
small demand probabilities, supply chain managers might use heuris-
tics to set inventory requirements and stock levels of these parts. 
Contracting personnel told us they use both INS or NSO char-
acteristics and frequency characteristics to define low-demand items. 
Engineers, when determining if an item is low demand, reported using 
three characteristics, some overlapping: if an item (1) fails or is ordered 
very infrequently, (2) its lack of stockage could affect an aircraft’s 
MICAP status or lead to an AWP (awaiting parts) incident, or (3) it is 
an INS or NSO item.
The commercial firms that we interviewed generally define low-
demand items based on a low ordering frequency from their custom-
ers, who may not be the actual end-users. They do so in part because 
they often have visibility only on orders from distributors, not on the 
demand from end-users who order from these distributors. This lack 
of visibility on end-users or to their “installed base” precludes defining 
low demand based on equipment downtime or on characterizations 
similar to the INS or NSO designations used by the military.
Defining low-demand items by the frequency of orders for 
them requires setting a definition threshold, which the companies we 
researched set empirically. These thresholds, and the parts they include, 
are reviewed periodically. Thresholds can vary substantially. For exam-
ple, a 1996 DLA report defined low-demand items as those with less 
than four requisitions or twelve total units requisitioned in the past 
year7 (Hobbs, 1996), while a 2002 Air Force Logistics Management 
Agency report (Parrish et al., 2002) identified low-demand items, spe-
cifically NSO items, as those with no more than ten demands per year. 
Similarly, one representative from industry whom we interviewed told 
of using a threshold of one demand per year to identify low-demand 
items, while another cited a threshold of fewer than ten demands per 
month and a third cited the combination of variation and order fre-
quency to define low demand.
7 The 1996 DLA report also indicated that 80 percent of DLA’s items at the time fit the 
low-demand definition and that about 50 percent of its inventory investment was also in low-
demand items.
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Definitions of low-demand parts can differ across industries or 
types of equipment. For example, the order threshold for defining a 
low-demand part for snow removal equipment used occasionally may 
be different and lower than that for a part in an airport radar system or 
medical diagnostics equipment that operates continuously.
How Can the Air Force Best Manage Low-Demand Parts?
In this monograph we analyze low-demand parts in the Air Force con-
text and how the service might best be able to develop supply strate-
gies for them. We do so by reviewing the general types of low-demand 
items the Air Force has, the best commercial practices that are used to 
manage such items, and the ways these practices could be applied to 
the Air Force.
In Chapter Two we review data on the types of items that consti-
tute low-demand parts, the dollars that are spent on them, and the sup-
pliers that provide them. We assess two different types of low-demand 
items. First, we use an ordering threshold to assess low-demand items 
in general and then to assess the characteristics of items whose annual 
orders fall below this threshold, including the spend on them. Second, 
we assess the characteristics of INS and NSO parts that lead to MICAP 
and AWP incidents. We prefer the requisition threshold for defining 
low-demand parts, because many INS and NSO parts are, in fact, 
ordered rather frequently. Nevertheless, for reasons we later discuss 
pertaining to data issues, using a threshold definition was not feasible 
for MICAP and AWP data.
In Chapter Three we discuss some of the best commercial prac-
tices that have been used in purchasing and supply chain management 
of low-demand parts. The research for this chapter is based on a series 
of interviews we conducted with industry representatives to identify 
best practices used by companies that were moving from a reactive to a 
proactive strategy for purchasing new and repairs of low-demand parts.
In Chapter Four we discuss how best practices can be applied to 
the purchasing and supply chain management of low-demand parts for 




Low-Demand Service Parts for the Air Force
In this chapter we analyze low-demand Air Force orders and purchases 
for low-demand service parts, including how much the Air Force 
spends on these items and their relative importance. We show prospec-
tive target areas where the Air Force could begin applying best supply 
strategy practices for low-demand parts and identify companies that, 
as measured by dollars, sell most of the Air Force’s low-demand parts.
Among our principal findings:
• most low-demand parts are in just a few federal supply groups 
(FSGs)
• low-demand parts represent a small number of total requisitions 
but a large number of parts that are requisitioned; they make up 
14 percent of what the Air Force spends for parts it manages
• many low-demand parts are supplied by original equipment man-
ufacturers (OEMs)
• most dollars for low-demand parts are spent with a small number 
of companies.
For our general analysis, we defined “low demand” by a requi-
sition threshold, specifically parts for which there were six or fewer 
requisitions per year. By using such a threshold, we were able to link 
low-demand (and other) parts to spend data. Unfortunately, we were 
not able to adequately link the requisition data to MICAP or AWP 
data; many parts associated with such incidents were not found in the 
requisition data, which were used to identify low-demand parts. We 
hypothesize that some of the mismatch may stem from parts removed 
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Table 2.1 








requisitions FY 2002 to FY 2004 2,020,824 56,186
MICaP incidents FY 1999 to mid-FY 2005 2,225,922 228,389
awP incidents March 2002 to March 2004 393,797 45,212
Spend FY 2001 to FY 2003 68,238 transactions 
(on 23,204 contracts)
19,011
note: these data contained the most current information available at the time 
we conducted the analyses for each data set. “requisitions,” “awP incidents,” and 
“spend” considered only air Force–managed items. “MICaP incidents” were based 
on a larger set of nIIns managed by the air Force, DLa, or other military services.
versus those ordered (newer versions are typically purchased) and from 
higher-level parts that are removed and repaired with lower-level pur-
chased parts. For MICAP and AWP data, we used INS or NSO desig-
nation for such parts to identify low-demand parts.
For our analyses, we used data extracted from the Global Combat 
Support System–Air Force (GCSS-AF) for requisitions, contracts, and 
AWP and MICAP incidents. Table 2.1 briefly describes these data. The 
appendix describes in more detail how we constructed the samples for 
our analyses.
We first use requisitions data to identify parts with fewer than six 
annual requisitions. We then analyze spend data on these low-demand 
items (not all of which were purchased in the years for which we ana-
lyze spend data). Finally, we analyze AWP and MICAP data with 
respect to INS and NSO items.
Requisitions Data
Altogether, we assessed data for about two million requisitions between 
FY 2002 and FY 2004, identifying 40,927 out of a total of 56,186 
NIINs with six or fewer annual requisitions per year. We were unable 
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to include NIINs with zero demands over the study period.1 Defining 
low demand by the number of annual requisitions is the approach most 
cited by representatives of commercial firms whom we interviewed and 
has, as noted, been used in some previous analyses of low-demand 
items for the Air Force.
In defining low demand, we considered the quantity of items 
ordered in a requisition but did not include it in our definition because 
the requisitions for most low-demand items were not noticeably differ-
ent from items with more requisitions. We analyzed quantities per req-
uisition for parts as a function of the frequency of their annual orders. 
Data on NIIN quantities in a requisition show that most (54 percent) 
are for an average of less than two, and that about two in three (68 per-
cent) are for an average of less than five.
Our threshold of six requisitions was based on our observation 
that the rate of change in the number of orders for parts seemed to 
taper off after about six requisitions per year. We noted that after six 
requisitions per year, fewer NIINs were associated with each succes-
sive category, indicating a broad distribution of requisitions per year 
for other NIINs ordered more frequently.2 We used requisitions data 
to assess the distribution of all items by the number of requisitions for 
them, the types of items that constitute low-demand items, and the 
leading requesters of low-demand items.
Items by Frequency of Requisition
Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of the number of all Air Force 
weapon-system NIINs by the annual number of requisitions for them 
from FY 2002 to FY 2004. Of the NIINs requisitioned during this 
time, 39 percent had, on average, less than one requisition per year. 
1 The contract and requisition data used in these analyses did not overlap well with Air 
Force requirements data, which prevented us from deriving a single list of NIINs managed 
by the Air Force that would have included the low-demand NIINs identified in the requisi-
tion data, contract NIINs, and zero-demand NIINs.
2 One NIIN was ordered on average 4,012 times per year over the three-year analysis 
period.
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Figure 2.1 
Distribution of NIINs by Number of Annual Requisitions,  
FY 2002 to FY 2004
SOURCE: FY 2002 to FY 2004 Air Force requisition, Strategic Sourcing Analysis Tool.




















Altogether, 73 percent of NIINs were low demand, or had, on average, 
six or fewer requisitions per year.3
The distribution of NIINs by requisitions, and of requisitions by 
NIINs, appears to follow a Pareto principle. Overall, 85 percent of the 
NIINs account for only 20 percent of requisitions (and, conversely, 80 
percent of requisitions are for only 15 percent of the NIINs). More spe-
cifically, we found that low-demand NIINs comprised 10.3 percent of 
all requisitions between FY 2002 and FY 2004. This pattern conforms 
to one identified by many representatives of the companies we inter-
viewed, who said an “80-20” rule applied to their orders as well.
As indicated, we did not include quantities ordered per requisition 
in our low-demand definition. Figure 2.2 shows that the quantities per 
requisition for low-demand NIINs were not noticeably different from
3 The sum of the percent of NIINs that have six or fewer requisitions per year is actually 
73, though because of rounding in the figure it appears to be 75 percent. Also, those NIINs 
that have less than one requisition per year may have had only one or two requisitions over 
the three-year period.
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Figure 2.2 
Average Number of Annual Requisitions of NIINs (percent),  
FY 2002 to FY 2004












































other NIINs that were ordered more frequently on an annual basis. 
Though NIINs that are ordered on average four to five times per year 
appear to be different, they make up only 4 percent of all NIINs and 
almost 5 percent of low-demand NIINs.
Types and Requesters of Low-Demand Items
Knowing the types of low-demand items that are requested can help 
the Air Force better target strategies for acquiring them. We analyzed 
data on the types of low-demand parts requisitioned and purchased as 
well as requestors of such items. (We later assess data by FSG in INS 
and NSO data on items that were used to resolve AWP and MICAP 
incidents.)
Table 2.2 shows the top five FSGs for requisitions of low-demand 
items. An FSG, defined by the first two positions of the federal 
supply class (FSC), permits an analysis of NIINs by category type. 
The FSGs in Table 2.2 comprise almost 65 percent of all Air Force 
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Table 2.2 
Top Five FSGs for Low-Demand Requisition Items, FY 2002 to FY 2004
Rank FSG FSG Name Percent
1 59 electric and electronic equipment components 30.4
2 15 aircraft and airframe structural components 9.8
3 66 Instruments and laboratory equipment 9.0
4 58 Communications, detection and coherent radiation 
equipment
8.0
5 61 electric wire, and power and distribution equipment 7.6
others 35.2
 total 100.0
sustainment low-demand items, with one, electric and electronic 
equipment components, comprising more than 30 percent of such 
requisitions.
While the components and designs among components in any 
similar commodity grouping will be different, any preponderance of 
demands for low-demand items suggests opportunities for exploring 
what is common across these parts to develop supply strategies. For 
example, are these components similar to items with high and medium 
demands? Are they produced by the same supplier? Could they be con-
solidated to single contracts? Should the Air Force directly contract for 
the long-lead-time raw materials that could be used by various suppli-
ers for similar technologies?
Low-demand requisitions are made by hundreds of Air Force loca-
tions as identified by Department of Defense Activity Address Codes 
(DoDAACs). Table 2.3 shows the locations with the most requisitions 
for low-demand items as well as the locations with the most requisi-
tions for all items regardless of demand.
Requisitions for low-demand items are more concentrated than 
those for all items. Nearly half of all requisitions for low-demand items 
come from the top five locations requesting such items, ranked in Table 
2.3 in descending order, with the top three locations accounting for 
nearly 46 percent of such requisitions. By contrast, the top five loca-
tions for requisitions of all items account for only 33 percent of such 
requisitions.
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Table 2.3 
Top Five Air Force Locations with the Most Requisitions for Low-Demand 
and for All Items, FY 2002 to FY 2004









warner robins aLC 16.0 oklahoma City aLC 13.2
oklahoma City aLC 15.5 warner robins aLC 8.2
ogden aLC 14.2 ogden aLC 7.0
Dyess aFB 1.9 Langley aFB 2.7
ellsworth aFB 1.8 eglin aFB 2.0
all others 50.7 all others 66.9
total 100.0a total 100.0
a Due to rounding, percents appear to sum to more than 100.
Warner Robins ALC, which repairs and overhauls C-5, C-130, 
and F-15 aircraft and ground and support equipment, has the most 
requisitions for low-demand items, as well as the second-most overall 
requisitions. Oklahoma City ALC, which manages engines, tankers, 
and electronic surveillance aircraft, had the second-most requisitions 
for low-demand items. Ogden ALC, which is responsible for support of 
tactical aircraft, such as the F-16, and commodities, such as common 
avionics and wheels and brakes, had the third-most low-demand requi-
sitions, and well as the third-most overall requisitions. Two Air Force 
bases, Dyess and Ellsworth, round out the top five locations with the 
most requisitions for low-demand items, each accounting for nearly 
2 percent of such requisitions. Both bases have relatively small bomber 
fleets, including B-1B aircraft. Altogether, data on requisitions for low-
demand items by location suggest that if the Air Force needs to improve 
management of these parts, it can begin by focusing on the three ALCs 
and then apply lessons learned there to other locations. Having many 
low-demand items at only three locations offers opportunities to work 
more closely with the suppliers of these parts.4 It is when low demands 
4 Aggressive emphasis on reducing administrative and production lead times can help miti-
gate the impact of errors in forecasting, which are bound to arise with low-demand items 
because they have variable demands.
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can be viewed as similar or in larger groupings that proactive supply 
strategies make more economic sense.
Spend Data
For spend data on low-demand items, we extracted GCSS-AF con-
tract data for purchases the Air Force made between FY 2001 and 
FY 2003 for items it manages.5 Each contract transaction recorded in 
these data contains the NIIN, the dollar value, the quantity of items 
being supplied, the unit price, and whether the transaction was sole 
source. We analyze as low-demand items those that were also identified 
as low-demand NIINs in our analysis of requisition data. Using the 
Consumer Price Index for “All Urban Consumers, U.S. All Items,” we 
adjusted all dollar figures in the contact data analysis to reflect constant 
values for FY 2003.
Spend analyses are conducted to identify prospective targets of 
opportunity for reducing total costs and improving performance by 
increasing leverage with suppliers and by working with key suppliers 
to further reduce total costs and improve. They are meant to inform 
where to focus one’s future efforts (where the greatest payoff is likely 
to be in developing better supplier relationships). Spend analyses iden-
tify how much is spent in certain commodity groups and with specific 
suppliers.
Suppliers of Low-Demand Items
Most parent companies of suppliers of low-demand items are origi-
nal equipment manufacturers, such as United Technologies Corpora-
tion (UTC), Raytheon, Boeing, Honeywell, Lockheed Martin, and 
Northrop Grumman, which supply original parts and equipment. This 
suggests that improved low-demand supply strategies could begin with 
those manufacturers and be part of their strategic sourcing contracts.
5 During the study period the most recent data in the Strategic Sourcing Analysis Tool were 
for FY 2001 to FY 2003.
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Table 2.4 shows the top companies as ranked by the dollar value 
of low-demand items they provide to the Air Force. It also lists infor-
mation on total spending for spare and repair parts, the number of 
low-demand contracts (that is, the number of contracts with at least 
one low-demand item) and total contracts for spare and repair parts, 
the percent of spare and repair contract dollars that are for low-demand 
items, the percent of spare and repair contracts with a low-demand 
item, the percent of dollars for low-demand items that are for sole-
source items, and the percent of all dollars for spare and repair items 
that are for sole-source goods, that the Air Force has with each firm. 
We list the top twelve companies because they include two additional 
companies that are among the top spend for both low-demand items 
and all items. We review below some highlights for individual firms.
The Air Force purchased $314 million in low-demand spares or 
component repairs from UTC between FY 2001 and FY 2003, more 
than it purchased from any other provider. UTC was also the single 
largest provider of all spare and repair items to the Air Force during 
this time, accounting for 18 percent of all dollars the Air Force spent 
on spare and repair items. Overall, 22 percent of UTC contracts had at 
least one low-demand item.
The second-biggest Air Force supplier of low-demand parts was 
Engineered Support Systems Inc., which provided $211 million in low-
demand parts between FY 2001 and FY 2003.6 These accounted for 
nearly 56 percent of all dollars the Air Force spent with this firm on 
spare and repair items. The second-biggest supplier of all spare and 
repair parts to the Air Force was Lockheed Martin. Only 4 percent of 
dollars the Air Force spent with Lockheed Martin was for low-demand 
parts, but this still placed Lockheed among the top ten suppliers of 
low-demand parts to the Air Force. In fact, the top twelve suppliers 
of low-demand spare and repair parts to the Air Force included the 
top ten suppliers of parts overall to the Air Force. This indicates that 
many of the firms to which the Air Force should target purchasing and 
6 In 2005, Engineered Support Systems Inc. (ESSI) was acquired by DRS Technologies, 
which is a large business. ESSI’s emphasis on support was reportedly a major reason for 
DRS’s interest in acquiring the company (Terry, 2005).
























































































1 1 United 
technologies
314 2,197 350 1,612 14 22 96 89
2 7 engineered 
Support Systems
211 378 24 172 56 14 99 59
3 5 a1a enterprises 130 639 704 1,346 20 52 23 39
4 3 raytheon 79 710 115 260 11 44 24 19
5 8 Boeing 64 295 138 384 22 36 81 63
6 14 Mine Safety 
appliances 
51 128 7 11 40 64 100 100
7 4 honeywell 44 661 253 902 7 28 83 75
8 2 Lockheed Martin 32 786 116 314 4 37 89 53
9 10 northrop 
Grumman 
29 265 208 533 11 39 60 63
10 38 ataP 28 32 29 36 88 81 24 24
11 6 Goodrich 22 476 182 654 5 28 80 59
12 9 Bae Systems 15 272 165 414 5 40 66 58
others 703 5,079 5,422 16,547 14 33 49 46
total 1,722 11,918 7,713 23,185 14 33 64 58
note: Low demand is defined as having up to and including six requisitions per year over the period FY 2002 to FY 2004.
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supply chain management initiatives are also those to which it should 
target initiatives to improve proactive supply strategies for low-demand 
parts.
Two of the top twelve suppliers of low-demand parts are not 
among the top twelve overall suppliers of spare and repair parts. These 
are ATAP and Mine Safety Appliances.7 Both firms, along with Engi-
neered Support Systems, have a sizable portion of their sales of spare 
and repair parts to the Air Force in low-demand parts: 88 percent for 
ATAP, 56 percent for Engineered Support Systems, and 40 percent 
for Mine Safety Appliances. Firms that are leading suppliers of low-
demand but not other spare and repair parts to the Air Force may indi-
cate some proactive approaches to purchasing and supply chain man-
agement initiatives of low-demand parts. A1A Enterprises also had at 
least one low-demand item on 52 percent of its contracts for spare and 
repair parts with the Air Force.
Most low-demand items have a sole or single source.8 Without 
competition or reasonable substitutes, the opportunities for gaining 
leverage over suppliers providing these goods may be even more lim-
ited than it is for other low-demand goods. Suppliers may be reluctant 
to institute any purchasing and supply chain management initiatives 
for these goods if such efforts require investment on their part and if 
the Air Force has no alternative source for them. Nevertheless, the Air 
Force could seek improvements here if information on supplier support 
7 According to the Central Contractor Registration database (accessible via the Business 
Partner Network website), Mine Safety Appliances is a large business. Among other things, 
Mine Safety Appliances supplies gas masks to the Air Force. ATAP is a small business that 
operates depot overhaul facilities. 
8 We determined whether a contract was sole or single source by matching the Strategic 
Sourcing Analysis Tool NIIN-level data with DD350 data, which contains information on 
the number of sources. Our analysis of these data does not differentiate between sole-source 
items (those for which there are no other viable and capable providers of requested goods and 
services) and single-source items (those for which a single source is selected among others for 
specific reasons). For simplicity we refer to them jointly as “sole-source.” DD350 data come 
from DoD Form 350, Individual Contract Action Record. Any transactions of $25,000 or 
more were recorded at the time of this study. It has since been succeeded by Federal Pro-
curement Data System–Next Generation, which requires reporting of transactions valued at 
$2,500 or more. 
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were shared with and used, legally, by the acquisition community when 
negotiating with these same suppliers for new business.
Spend on Differing Groups of Items
Table 2.2 above uses requisition data to show the FSGs in which the 
Air Force requisitions the most low-demand goods. Table 2.5 below 
uses data on expenditures to show the categories of low-demand goods 
on which the Air Force spends the most money. Not surprisingly, the 
five FSGs shown earlier rank among the top ten FSGs in which the 
Air Force spends money on low-demand goods, but there are others 
that rank higher by expenditures. For example, the Air Force spent 
more money on low-demand items in FSG 28, comprising engines, 
turbines, and components, than for any other, but this FSG was not 
among the top five with the most requisitioned items. Similarly, the Air 
Force spent more money on low-demand items in FSG 39, materials 
handling equipment, than any other but FSG 28, but this, too, was not 
among the top five with the most requisitioned items. 
The FSGs shown in Table 2.5 comprise 83 percent of all spending 
for low-demand items and 77 percent of that for all spare and repair 
items. Engines, turbines, and components comprise 26 percent of all 
low-demand item spending and 36 percent of contract dollar spending 
for all items. Aircraft components and accessories similarly is among 
the highest-ranking FSGs for low-demand items but accounts for an 
even larger proportion of dollars spent on all spare and repair items. By 
contrast, materials handling equipment items comprise 13 percent of 
reported spending for low-demand items but only 2 percent of contract 
dollars for all spare and repair items. Overall, 96 percent of dollars 
spent for materials handling equipment spare and repair items were for 
low-demand items. All other FSGs listed in Table 2.5 similarly account 
for a higher proportion of spending on low-demand items than they 
do on all spare and repair items. Still, there was a great deal of overlap 
between the ranking of FSGs for low-demand parts and those for all 
spare and repair parts. Eight of the ten FSGs listed in Table 2.5 are also 
among the top ten FSGs ranked by contract dollars for all spare and 
repair parts, and all are among the top fifteen FSGs ranked by contract 
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Table 2.5 
Types of Low-Demand Parts the Air Force Is Buying: 















































1 1 28 engines, turbines, and components 442.1 4,312.40 25.7 36.2 10
2 10 39 Materials handling equipment 222.7 231.20 12.9 1.9 96
3 5 59 electrical and electronic equipment 
components 
163.2 775.60 9.5 6.5 21
4 4 58 Communication, detection and 
coherent radiation equipment 
161.9 801.00 9.4 6.7 20
5 6 15 aircraft and airframe structural 
components
101.7 682.40 5.9 5.7 15
6 13 14 Guided missiles 84.5 174.50 4.9 1.5 47
7 2 16 aircraft components and accessories 70.3 1,327.00 4.1 11.1 5
8 7 66 Instruments and laboratory 
equipment
63.6 420.90 3.7 3.5 15
9 15 42 Fire fighting, rescue, and safety 
equipment; and environmental 
protection equipment and materials
59.1 152.50 3.4 1.3 38
10 9 61 electric wire, and power and 
distribution equipment 
56.2 258.30 3.3 2.2 22
others 296.8 2,781.80 17.2 23.4 11
total 1,722.1 11,917.60 100.0 100.0 14
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How Low-Demand Items Are Purchased
We found that the Air Force tends to purchase low-demand items 
as needed, often using a purchase order in the same year that items 
were requisitioned, i.e., on contracts that are written after an actual 
demand rather than in advance of one. We hypothesize that this stems 
from a requirements process that might not have projected demands 
for these items and would not have recommended any future buy or 
repair requirements. Table 2.6 presents characteristics of low-demand 
and other (i.e., not low-demand) spare and repair items.
We found that 53.5 percent of the low-demand transactions 
occurred in the same year as the initial base award for the contract 
on which they were made, while only 40.9 percent of other items had 
transactions in the initial year of their contract. We also found that the 
Air Force is more likely to use short-term purchase orders for buying 
low-demand spare and repair items more often than for other parts. 
(Purchase orders valued of no more than $25,000 are used for lesser-
dollar, one-time, or price catalog purchases.) We found that purchase 
orders made up 39.1 percent of all low-demand transactions (and 50.5 
percent of contracts for low-demand items) but only 20.5 percent of 
transactions for other spare and repair items (and 37.9 percent of con-
tracts for them). These data suggest, as noted, that the Air Force tends 
to purchase low-demand items as needed, rather than as part of a long-
term supply strategy. This purchasing phenomenon may arise from the 
requirements process that often projects zero demands for low-demand 
parts (assuming they are represented) and to separate purchases in 
response to actual requisitions.
Table 2.6 








Low demand 12,131 53.5 39.1
all other 55,742 40.9 20.5
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Low-Demand Parts in MICAP and AWP Incidents
Unfortunately, as noted, we were not able to adequately link requisition 
data to MICAP or AWP data. A portion of the NIINs in the MICAP 
and AWP data were not found in the requisitions data.9 As a result, 
we were not able to use our preferred definition of a “low-demand” 
part—i.e., one with no more than six requisitions per year—to assess 
low-demand parts in MICAP and AWP incidents. Instead, we analyze 
those parts in MICAP and AWP incidents that were designated INS 
or NSO.
Our data on MICAP incidents span from October 1998 to April 
2005. Each incident represents one occurrence of an aircraft part that 
was not available from supply and led to an aircraft not able to fly at 
least one of its missions.10 MICAP parts can be isolated to one air-
craft or more, for example, if more than one aircraft requires the same 
unavailable part. The data we analyzed yielded information on more 
than 200,000 NIINs needed to resolve more than 2 million MICAP 
incidents. Our data on AWP incidents span from March 2002 to May 
2004. Again, each incident represents one occurrence of an aircraft 
that had to await parts that were not in local supply inventories.11
9 Because sub-master NIINs are found in requisitions data, we linked sub-master NIINs 
to the MICAP and AWP NIINs, but this did not appreciably improve our “match” rate 
between the data sets.
10 Through FY 2003, MICAP data included one record per month for each MICAP inci-
dent. For our analysis we used, for a given unique combination of document number, NIIN, 
and quantity, only the MICAP observation with the highest number of MICAP hours that 
also indicated ultimate completion of the incident, i.e., that mission capability was restored. 
This ensured that each MICAP incident had only one record in the data we analyzed and was 
counted only once. Some records we analyzed did not indicate completion of the incident. 
We assumed that all observations that lasted more than six months (or, more specifically, 183 
days or 4,392 hours) were not properly coded as having in fact been resolved. This led us to 
delete approximately 1.6 percent of the approximately 3 million MICAP records in our ini-
tial data. 
11 As with MICAP data through FY 2003, a given AWP incident extending more than one 
month could have more than one record. For our analysis we used the record showing the 
highest number of AWP days for a given incident. We also deleted records showing AWP 
incidents exceeding six months, assuming these records were not properly coded as having in 
fact been resolved.
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Table 2.7 indicates that about one in four NIINs needed to 
resolve MICAP or AWP incidents were INS or NSO items, and that 
about one in fourteen incidents involved an INS or NSO item. Regard-
ing the causes of these incidents, we found that 84 percent of MICAP 
incidents attributable to an INS or NSO part were due to the part 
not being stocked at an operating location, compared to 13 percent 
of AWP incidents.12 Among the MICAP and AWP NIINs, 61 per-
cent of the MICAP INS/NSO (low-demand) NIINs and 21 percent 
of AWP INS/NSO (low-demand) NIINs were “not stocked” among 
all MICAP or AWP incidents for these NIINs. For some low-demand 
parts, it is more economical to stock parts centrally and to ship directly 
to the requisitioning unit ordering the low-demand part.
Table 2.8 shows the duration of MICAP and AWP incidents 
attributable to INS/NSO items and to other items.13 MICAP and 
AWP incidents involving INS/NSO parts took more time to resolve 
than those involving other types of NIINs. The durations of MICAP 
incidents for INS/NSO NIINs, nearly 294 hours, were 24 percent 
longer than those involving other NIINs, while the durations of AWP 
incidents for INS/NSO NIINs, more than four days, were 5 percent 
longer than for other NIINs. This suggests that, on average, it took the 
12 About 12 percent of the remaining MICAP incidents for these kinds of parts were caused 
by ordered parts not yet received, whereas about 84 percent of AWP incidents have unknown 
causes. 
The cause codes we considered to represent “not stocked” included “A—No demand or 
reparable generation before this request,” “B—Past demand or reparable generation experi-
ence but [Air Force] base stockage policy precluded establishing level,” “C—Single Man-
ager/Inventory Management Specialist (SM/IMS) has determined the item should not be 
stocked at base level,” and “D—Base decision not to stock the item.” Cause codes for ordered 
parts that have not yet been received are “H—Less than full base stock – stock replenish-
ment requisition exceeds priority group UMMIPS standards,” and “J—Less than full base 
stock – stock replenishment requisition does not exceed priority group UMMIPS standards.” 
Unknown causes are coded “M—undefined MICAP/AWP cause.”   
13 As noted above, because some records did not apparently indicate the completion of a 
MICAP or AWP incident, we dropped records for all incidents that were longer than six 
months. To the extent that these cases did indeed exceed six months, our data, and Table 2.8, 
understate the length of MICAP and AWP incidents. Understatement and overstatement 
could pose problems for our analysis should they differ fundamentally for INS/NSO items 
and other items.
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Table 2.7 
Percent of INS and NSO NIINs and Incidents for MICAP and AWP Data  


















average MICaP hours 237.0 293.6 56.6a
average awP days 3.9 4.1 0.2a
a Indicates statistically significant differences at the 0.1 percent level.
Air Force longer to fulfill MICAP requisitions for low-demand NIINs 
than for other NIINs.
Summary Observations
As measured by number of requisitions, among the more typical 
low-demand items the Air Force requests are electric and electronic 
equipment components as well as aircraft and airframe structural 
components. Nearly half the demand for low-demand items is fairly 
concentrated, occurring at three air logistics centers. This suggests 
some initial target areas for improving supply strategies of low-demand 
items.
Spend data on these items reinforce the importance of these tar-
gets. All of the top five categories of low-demand items as measured by 
number of requisitions are also among the top ten FSGs as measured 
by the dollars the Air Force spends on them. The ten FSGs on which 
the most dollars for low-demand items are spent account for 83 percent 
of spend for low-demand items and 77 percent for all spare and repair 
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items. This indicates that many of the items for which the Air Force 
should target general purchasing and supply chain management initia-
tives are likely the same ones for which strategies for low-demand items 
should be developed as well. 
Spend data also show that many of the top parent suppliers of 
low-demand items are also the top suppliers of all spare and repair 
items. This is good news, because many of the firms for which the Air 
Force should seek to implement purchasing and supply chain manage-
ment strategies are also those for which it should seek to implement 
strategies for low-demand items. A great deal of the spend for low-
demand items among these top suppliers is for sole-source items, which 
may have implications for the kinds of supply strategies available to the 
Air Force for these items. 
Data on the methods of purchasing low-demand items indicate 
that the Air Force likely purchases low-demand items as needed, rather 
than as part of a long-term supply strategy. This may have negative 
impacts on material availability to the extent that low-demand items 
take longer to receive than other orders.
In the next chapter we examine best commercial practices in 
developing supply strategies for low-demand parts. In the subsequent 
chapter we examine how these might be applied to the Air Force.
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Best Practices in Developing Supply Strategies  
for Low-Demand Service Parts
To learn about best commercial practices in the private sector, we con-
ducted interviews with representatives of nine companies that the busi-
ness and academic literature or peer companies considered to be success-
ful in developing supply strategies for low-demand parts. Representatives 
from each company we interviewed were working proactively to address 
low-demand parts problems so as to improve customer satisfaction, asset 
availability, and corporate profitability or returns on assets. The com-
panies we interviewed were either manufacturers or supported expen-
sive end-items purchased by customers who expected high equipment or 
part availability rates or were themselves customers for the end-items. We 
interviewed representatives from aerospace, automotive, heavy equip-
ment, and electronics and communication firms.1 Some firms were origi-
nal equipment manufacturers, others were manufacturers of subsystems, 
and still others were end-users of major capital products. 
The products of the companies we interviewed had life cycles that 
spanned 10 to 15 years (high technology and automotive), 25 years 
(commercial aerospace), and 40 to 50 years (heavy equipment, equip-
ment motors). Each company had low-demand parts for the breadth of 
its products. Each one was in the process of developing supply strategies 
for most, if not all, of its low-demand parts. One company was extend-
ing support of low-demand parts beyond the timeframe required by 
1 As a condition of obtaining interviews, we agreed not to identify companies participating 
in this study.
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regulation to expand its long-term product market share by improving 
brand loyalty and customer satisfaction. Another company was modi-
fying its policy of very-long-life support to charging the customer all 
costs for any support provided past certain time limits. 
Some of the companies participating in this study conducted little 
or no business with the Department of Defense (DoD). These partici-
pating companies supported expensive products with very high avail-
ability requirements and many low-demand parts and had experience 
directly relevant to this study. For those companies that did sell goods 
or services to DoD, we interviewed representatives of divisions selling 
commercial (rather than military) goods and services. 
The companies we studied share several characteristics. All have 
global operations and multiple distribution or operating locations. 
Those that manufactured products had distributors with self-owned 
inventory and varying degrees of visibility by the company to the inven-
tory of distributors or to end-customer demands. Many had responded 
to the economic downturn in 2001 by setting enterprise-level goals for 
their service operations and becoming more efficient, implementing 
best practices for purchasing and supply chain management and apply-
ing them also to low-demand parts. Those we interviewed said it took 
years to implement best practices, but that some investments showed 
positive returns in less than one year. Though all the companies that we 
interviewed in our study are seeking contract coverage for all their parts, 
none had yet achieved it. Some were making investments in process and 
technology improvements for all service parts, including low-demand 
parts, and expected to see measurable benefits in the near and long 
term. Some of these investments included new information systems 
and forecasting methodologies, supplier relationship management pro-
grams, centralized pooling of requirements across business units, etc.
Our interviewees told us that where a product is in its life cycle 
determines to a large degree the best practices and strategies that are 
available to assure supply of low-demand parts for it. 
In general, they have found that the best time for developing 
supply strategies for low-demand parts is before production begins, 
when the manufacturer or buyer has the most leverage with suppliers. 
The incentives for providing long-term support of low-demand parts 
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can be aligned better so that what the customer needs, the supplier is 
more willing to provide then, rather than later, when the balance of 
leverage shifts to the supplier. This alignment pertains to all parts, but 
especially to low-demand parts, for reasons we will discuss. We discuss 
the various supply strategies used for low-demand parts within the con-
text of a product life cycle. Many of these reflect strategies that firms 
are implementing to improve support of all their parts. We begin by 
discussing private-sector goals that are leading firms to seek improve-
ments in purchasing and supply chain management for their spare and 
repair parts, including their low-demand parts.
Private-Sector Goals
Private firms must satisfy both customers and their owners (or sharehold-
ers). One increasingly common means they use to do this is to give the 
issue of aftermarket services higher priority than it has had in the past. 
OEMs and retail companies consider customer satisfaction throughout 
the life of a product to be essential to luring customers back to buy new 
products.2 Once a product is purchased, aftermarket services become the 
primary face of manufacturing or retail companies to the customer. Cus-
tomers of expensive capital equipment demand good aftermarket support 
to operate their equipment efficiently and amortize their depreciation 
while maintaining a good resale value.3 As technologies mature and gaps 
narrow among products, making them more similar, buyers are giving 
greater weight to products that provide the best total life-cycle costs.
As a result, aftermarket services are an increasingly important 
aspect of business for many companies, affecting their growth and 
profitability. The aftermarket parts business itself is estimated to gener-
2 Once a product has been purchased, the OEM often becomes a sole-source supplier for 
parts and service similar to what happens in the DoD. Customer satisfaction becomes a com-
petitive factor for future business. This works best in markets with a robust supply base and 
competition.
3 A representative of one manufacturing company told us its customers try to quantify 
projected lost revenues due to equipment availability problems, depreciation costs, and still 
other measures when purchasing capital equipment.
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ate $400 billion in revenues per year (Gallagher, Mitchke, and Rogers, 
2005). Service contracts comprise just 3 to 4 percent of sales at leading 
electronics retailers such as Best Buy, but have operating profit margins 
above 50 percent (Berner, 2004). In fact, in 2004, service contracts 
contributed $600 million of Best Buy’s $1.3 billion profit. Likewise, 
for heavy industrial manufacturing companies, aftermarket services 
contributed 25 percent of revenues but 40 to 50 percent of overall prof-
its (Spellman, 2004). Similarly, the aftermarket service parts business 
has the highest profit margin for the automotive industry (Piszczal-
ski, 2003). Service also represents 24 percent of revenue but 45 per-
cent of profits in information technology (Chamberlain and Nunes, 
2004). Within the aerospace industry, some firms have sought to sell 
new products at or near cost while anticipating profits from the sales 
of aftermarket services (Rossetti and Choi, 2005; Ashenbaum, 2006). 
Indeed, Boeing, which is manufacturing the B-787 Dreamliner, is 
offering life-cycle management support for the first time with its Gold-
care Services product.
Given the focus of manufacturers and retailers on aftermarket 
services, end-users are also looking there to increase their own prof-
its by reducing the costs of such services. Some companies, such as 
NetJets, which sells shares of aircraft for individual private use, have 
outsourced maintenance and repair workload, inventory manage-
ment, and logistics and distribution operations to minimize total ser-
vice costs and focus on core competencies. Buyers are leveraging their 
purchases of aftermarket services, including provision of low-demand 
items that may be needed for spares or repairs, with a few key suppliers 
using performance-based arrangements. These buyers are outsourcing 
larger chunks of service capability to those that offer comprehensive 
service packages. These performance-based arrangements range from 
guaranteed fill rates of spare parts and on-time delivery schedules of 
repaired parts to product availability such as power-by-the-hour service 
and operational or uptime rates.4 In other cases, product users such as 
4 Enslow (2004) reports that 70 percent of “manufacturing-intensive” companies and 56 
percent of “distribution-intensive” companies have suppliers manage the inventory of their 
parts.
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airlines have formed joint ventures, with different partners assuming 
primary responsibility for particular aspects of maintenance, repair, and 
support operations, such as inventory management, “heavy checks” of 
engines (including equipment overhauls), and airframe and avionics work.
Both end-users and manufacturers that we interviewed claimed 
that about 80 percent of the aftermarket service parts needed consti-
tute about 20 percent of demand or orders for parts. Hence, they find 
themselves managing tens of thousands of parts that have no more 
than a few demands per year. Buyers find that proactively developing 
supply strategies for low-demand parts can positively affect equipment 
availability.
The benefits of improved supply strategies for low-demand parts 
can be quite substantial, because such parts purchased before demands 
occur usually remain in inventory longer and tie up resources that 
could have been used productively elsewhere. Low-demand parts have 
higher unit inventory management costs because their fixed man-
agement costs must be apportioned over fewer quantities. One way 
companies have considered cutting their aftermarket service costs is 
through reduced inventories of “slow-moving” parts that do not sell 
quickly (if at all). Not stocking such parts or stocking fewer of them 
means that responsive supply sources must be in place when demands 
arise. Interviewees from organizations that chose not to stock slow-
moving parts told us they were trying to develop supply strategies with 
suppliers to better align risk and incentives to ensure that suppliers can 
be quickly acquired when demands arise at lower total cost. Spellman 
(2004) indicates that the typical service-level agreement for high-tech 
or retail support requires response times of 48 hours or less.5
5 To the extent that the high-tech equipment is unique, such quick turnaround time may 
be challenging to achieve. However, response within this timeframe is necessary for the 
operation of certain Air Force equipment, such as the current generation of large unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs). However, a set of tail numbers from a particular type of UAV may not 
necessarily have identical parts demands because they were acquired using a spiral develop-
ment process. UAVs, like commercial aircraft, have unique ID numbers affixed to their tails 
that function like a serial number. Spiral development is an acquisition process that designs, 
develops, and produces new weapon systems on an incremental basis, adding capability with 
each spiral, which reduces risk, cost, and time to field and gives the warfighter enhanced 
capabilities sooner. However, each set of systems produced is slightly different from the pre-
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Having supply strategies and suppliers in place for low-demand 
parts may be more cost-effective than holding many of these parts in 
inventory. If customers give suppliers responsibility for delivering parts 
to a schedule, suppliers can decide whether to hold the parts in inven-
tory or produce them in response to actual demands. Suppliers say 
they can provide inventory for several companies more efficiently than 
a given company can provide for itself, and therefore help all reduce 
costs. (This advantage is more likely as the supplier’s number of cus-
tomers increases. If there is only one customer, other benefits must 
also be present for the supplier and its customer to both benefit. For 
example, supplier-managed inventories may reduce inventory costs if 
a performance-based contract incentivizes the supplier to purchase 
production materials for low-demand items to reduce production lead 
times.6) As customers give manufacturers and suppliers more aftermar-
ket responsibilities, these providers seek to develop better supply strat-
egies for low-demand parts to cut total costs while still meeting cus-
tomer expectations for services.
Product Life-Cycle Phases
As noted, firms implementing best commercial practices have found 
that supply strategies for parts are best tailored to specific phases of a 
life cycle. This especially applies to low-demand parts. That is, where 
a product is in its life cycle will affect the supply strategy that is devel-
oped at any given time. Supply strategies developed earlier in a product 
life cycle will differ from those developed later.
Figure 3.1 illustrates notionally the three distinct life-cycle phases 
for a product: design, production, and postproduction. Different incen-
tives are available in each phase for getting suppliers to assure long-term 
supplies of low-demand items. The phases of Air Force weapon system 
vious set, leading to a greater variety of parts that are fewer in number (Johnson and John-
son, 2002). 
6 Separate or weighted metrics that apply to low-demand items might be necessary to drive 
the right behavior.
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“products” are much more complex than those of products in the com-
mercial world. Nonetheless, these three phases illustrate supply strate-
gies available over the product’s life cycle. We review each of these below.
Design
During its first phase, design, a product moves from an ideal, concept, 
or requirement to a final set of plans describing how the product will be 
manufactured, used, and supported. (For purposes of this discussion, 
we consider research and development that may occur before design 
begins to be part of the design phase.) In the notional product life cycle 
above, this phase occurs between the start of design for the product 
and the start of its production (and aftermarket).
In this phase, plans become more concrete with detailed draw-
ings and product specifications, material selection, and development of
Figure 3.1 
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manufacturing processes. Much of the product’s ultimate cost is deter-
mined in this phase. If the product uses new technologies or differs 
significantly from older products, a prototype may be built to test tech-
nical feasibility of design and manufacturing processes.
Estimates of aftermarket services requirements also begin in this 
phase. Engineers estimate failure rates through historical and engineer-
ing analyses to determine an appropriate mix and quantity for initial 
provisioning of spare parts. Logisticians develop support concepts for 
field services, levels and sources of repair, supply (inventory), and sup-
pliers. They analyze how much repair will be done internally at organic 
facilities or in contracting support. They also consider the use of Con-
tractor Logistics Support (CLS) and Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) 
contracts for long-term weapon system support. 
Also in the design phase, the OEM determines how much prod-
uct to manufacture in-house or how much to function as an integra-
tor that assembles ready-built subsystems provided by suppliers. OEMs 
may develop and own the technical rights to the design of subsystems 
but choose not to manufacture them, instead finding suppliers to fabri-
cate the product more efficiently. Alternatively, OEMs may find suppli-
ers that can design and develop proprietary subsystems to meet techni-
cal and functional requirements. In this case, the supplier would own 
the technical rights to its subsystem and be involved in design. The 
extent to which suppliers invest their own capital in the design phase 
depends on the cost and complexity of new products.
Production
In the second phase, production, products are manufactured. The pro-
duction line ramps up and operates until the manufacturer decides to 
end production or reallocate resources to manufacturing other prod-
ucts. In the notional product life cycle depicted in Figure 3.1, this 
phase coincides with the time period 3 to 17 (with the rate of produc-
tion, and parts associated with the product, shown in the shaded area, 
peaking around time period 9).
Product sales, both actual and projected, influence the pace of 
production. Though there is uncertainty—owing to, e.g., unforeseen 
supply or economic shocks caused by supplier parts or capacity unavail-
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ability, labor or material shortages, or distribution bottlenecks—about 
the magnitude and timing of sales, once the decision on production 
size and schedule has been made, the manufacturer can schedule pro-
duction of product parts. Lean production techniques allow suppliers 
to provide needed parts at a prescribed time and sequence to be assem-
bled into final products at the same rate as production. Setting produc-
tion schedules translates into certain parts requirements. Suppliers can 
use these schedules to plan for material and distribution capacities and 
material purchases.
The aftermarket services phase begins once the first products that 
are sold require maintenance or their parts begin to fail, typically while 
production is still ongoing. As the number of products in operation 
increases, demands for aftermarket services also increase. Service parts, 
including low-demand service parts, may compete for parts with new 
production on manufacturing lines during the production phase of a 
product, but they are easier to produce during this phase as well.
Postproduction
In the third phase, postproduction, production of new products has 
ceased and only the aftermarket phase continues. In the notional prod-
uct life cycle depicted in Figure 3.1, this phase lasts from the time pro-
duction ceases around time period 17 until the last products reach the 
end of their product life, nearly 40 time periods after the product was 
first designed. In this phase, business volume comprises only aftermar-
ket services requirements. Figure 3.1 notionally shows the infrequent 
requirements of a particular low-demand part. In actuality, many dif-
ferent low-demand parts would exhibit infrequent demands over the 
duration of the product’s operating life. Demands for low-demand 
parts are intermittent, variable, and economically unattractive to com-
panies whose lines are optimized for maximum throughput.
Most companies guarantee some level of support for a period 
of time after production ends, but this period varies by industry and 
product. High-tech companies may offer support for as little as 18 
months, while automotive companies generally provide aftermarket 
services support for 10 years after production. Some manufacturers of 
heavy equipment offer aftermarket services for products for 15 years 
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following production, and then decide on a part-by-part basis which to 
support beyond this period. The commercial aerospace industry may 
offer aftermarket services for a still longer period. Boeing, for example, 
has publicly reported it has agreements with its avionics suppliers to 
provide aftermarket services as long as even only one of its products is 
still operating (Aeronautical Radio, Inc., 2003).
Once production has ended, supply options for low-demand parts 
quickly dwindle if a supply strategy is not in place. As business decreases 
to only aftermarket services, with no production volume, OEMs and 
customers start to lose their buying leverage with suppliers. Suppliers, 
particularly those on lower tiers who may be smaller and have fewer 
resources to weather lean times, may at some point exit the business 
altogether, especially if profitability drops below an acceptable thresh-
old. Once the OEM or supplier decides to end support of parts that are 
not available elsewhere, they become obsolete. This can create problems 
for end-users who are still operating equipment using these parts.
The cost of providing parts with low aftermarket demands 
increases once production ends and they are no longer needed for man-
ufacturing other products. If a part fails long after production ends, the 
OEM or supplier must locate the technical data, physical tools, equip-
ment, and personnel required to produce the part. This may be diffi-
cult if companies have changed ownership or location. Tools also may 
have been discarded, and skills needed to produce the parts may have 
atrophied or disappeared with workforce changes. The low volume and 
revenue associated with low-demand parts are also unlikely to entice 
new suppliers to replace those leaving the field.
We next discuss the design, production, and postproduction 
phases in more detail, including the supply strategies available with 
them. As we will see, the best options are available at the earliest phases 
of the product life cycle. Such strategies can be proactive, address-
ing the issue of low demand prior to actual demands from end-users. 
Supply strategies in the postproduction phase are more reactive, chal-
lenging, and likely to be associated with higher costs.
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Phase I, Design and Development: Minimizing Unique 
Parts to Reduce Total Cost and Low-Demand Parts
In general, the first, design phase of a product’s life cycle can offer the 
most opportunities for minimizing the total number of low-demand 
parts. We found through interviews that companies use three broad 
strategies to ensure supply of low-demand parts in the design and devel-
opment phase of a product’s life cycle: (1) involving buyers and suppliers 
in the design of new systems, products, and parts, (2) reducing com-
plexity (and hence the number of low-demand parts) by using common 
subsystems and parts, and (3) monitoring and managing obsolescence 
by identifying soon-to-be-obsolete parts, technologies, and processes. 
Involving buyers and suppliers in the design of new systems, products, 
and parts can help balance performance and cost objectives while min-
imizing unique parts to a specific product. Reducing complexity by 
using common subsystems and parts can also help minimize unique 
parts, and hence the ultimate number of parts that may have only low 
demands. Monitoring and managing obsolescence through a product’s 
life cycle can help avoid the need to replace parts that manufacturers or 
suppliers might discontinue. We discuss these further below.
Strategy 1: Involve Buyers and Suppliers in the Design of New 
Systems, Products, and Parts
This strategy focuses first on buyers and then on suppliers. The first 
part of this strategy is internally focused on the internal product devel-
opment processes. After discussing it, we then examine the second part 
of the strategy, which addresses suppliers.
Buyer Involvement. Involving an enterprise’s buyers in the supply 
strategy process can bring to the design process important supply chain 
considerations that might otherwise be overlooked. The traditional 
approach to product design has been to use performance require-
ments to design a product and establish a price based on the ultimate 
cost of producing it. Parts were designed for performance and opti-
mized to the particular platform. This led to a proliferation of uniquely 
designed parts across the portfolio of products, in turn contributing to 
an increase in low-demand parts.
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More companies are now analyzing markets they want to target 
with their products and identifying performance and price ranges that 
suit these markets. These companies are designing products to fit per-
formance and price targets, rather than viewing price as an output of 
the production process. The enterprise’s buyers are critical in this pro-
cess because they help ensure that a supplier’s inputs conform to per-
formance and cost targets.
Companies that bring their purchasing personnel into the design 
phase also do so because buyers may be familiar with past supply strat-
egy development and support issues that could affect new programs. 
They also have the most recent information on prospective suppliers 
and market conditions. Buyers can help engineering and technical per-
sonnel incorporate supply chain quality and total cost considerations 
into product designs and, together with market research teams, steer 
designers away from parts and technologies that will soon be obso-
lete. If companies have organized in ways to leverage their total busi-
ness, then buyers, with their enterprise-wide perspective, can also spot 
opportunities to improve quality or price. 
Buyers can also facilitate greater use of standardized parts from 
fewer suppliers across systems to maximum practicable levels within 
OEM designs and as a condition of design contracts. Otherwise, engi-
neering and technical buyers can help establish in design contracts 
with suppliers provisions for access or purchasing rights to technical 
data and drawings during the postproduction phase. Buyers can also 
help establish critical supply chain elements early. They can identify 
supply chain concerns or solutions to product design teams so that 
difficult-to-support design features can be analyzed by engineering and 
technical personnel.
Supplier Involvement. Some companies are also involving pro-
spective suppliers in the design phase to improve innovation and reduce 
total life-cycle costs by optimizing parts availability, cost, and quality 
subject to design and product considerations. Suppliers know whether 
existing parts can fit the requirement, and thereby help reduce costs 
in developing new next-higher assembly components or subsystems as 
well as the number of low-demand parts. They can help guide engi-
neers toward more cost-effective solutions to performance with lower 
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expense and risk to availability and quality. Suppliers know which 
parts are interchangeable and can recommend ways to change designs 
to minimize manufacturing costs.7 By being included in the design 
phase, potential suppliers of components and subsystems are able to 
apply their expertise to finding solutions that satisfy cost, quality, and 
performance concerns, sometimes by introducing new technologies to 
produce a part better and at less cost.
Some companies have even made their suppliers invest in new 
product designs, effectively making partners of them. Boeing did this 
with Pratt & Whitney for one of the engines that will be used on 
the new B-787 aircraft. The partnership spreads the risk of develop-
ment and also increases incentives for suppliers to balance performance 
with long-term costs. Bringing suppliers into the design phase creates 
incentives for the same goals of looking long-term to support consider-
ations down deeper into the supply chain to suppliers in the lower tiers. 
Developing a partnership can include incentives for suppliers to pro-
vide support throughout a product’s life cycle, for example to recoup 
research and development investments they have made with OEMs.
Strategy 2: Reduce Complexity by Using Common Subsystems and Parts
The use of similar subsystems, assemblies, and parts across product 
lines and equipment can reduce supply chain complexity inherent 
to the design while extending the parts’ production period, increas-
ing total demand for them and reducing the potential number of 
low-demand parts. The lack of standardization of parts that could be 
common across products or platforms increases the total number of 
unique parts that must be managed, as well as supply chain complex-
ity.8 It can also delay, in effect, the end-of-production period of older 
7 Some companies intentionally design product-unique parts to distinguish themselves 
competitively. By increasing the number of parts that are specific to a product, they raise the 
cost to entering the market for aftermarket services. Unless the product is inexpensive, the 
proliferation of unique parts will also raise product support costs for the customer.
8 Motorola reduced its product portfolio complexity in 2001 when it used more purchasing 
engineers in its product development and reduced its supplier base by more than two-thirds. 
It reduced complexity in the number of different parts and material that it needed to buy and 
manage (Carbone, 2001).
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products, which benefit from the production of newer products using 
common low-demand parts.
Figure 3.2 illustrates notionally the effect of using a common part 
in two products with differing production runs. In this example, design 
of Product A begins a notional 44-period life cycle, with its production 
beginning in the 4th time period. Product B enters design in the 9th 
time period and enters production in the 12th. Product A ends pro-
duction in the 16th time period, but Product B doesn’t end production 
until the 22nd. The effect of this is to reduce the period of low demand 
(particularly for Product A). Aftermarket demands are depicted by a 
single low-demand part. Many parts that have low demands would 
exhibit the same infrequent low-volume demand in the postproduction 
phase during the product’s operating life.
Companies that make incremental changes to their products to 
improve performance and quality may be able to use similar or even 
identical underlying parts of older models. The supplier can benefit 
from using common parts across different products. It can mitigate 
product risk and cost of production.
Figure 3.2 
Notional Life Cycles for Products Using Common Parts
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When production extends over a longer period, the supplier of 
parts used in several different products can benefit from a larger cumu-
lative business volume. The broader volume reduces the average fixed 
cost per unit by spreading the fixed cost of designing the part and set-
ting up the manufacturing line across more units.
The broader business volume that the use of common parts in 
new products permits is also likely to make the supplier consider the 
OEM a better customer, possibly giving it higher priority and more 
responsive service than buyers of smaller lots with shorter production 
runs. The overall aftermarket demands of these parts will increase as 
they are installed in more products.
Complexity can also be reduced by using technology that is 
already installed in other products. Another method of reducing com-
plexity in existing systems is to upgrade subsystems simultaneously or 
in close succession as budgets allow. Commonly used upgraded sub-
systems, just like commonly used parts, reduce the number of parts 
unique to a product and can thereby mitigate the number of parts 
likely to have only low demands.
In some cases, it may be more effective to design new subsystems 
than to replace parts in old ones. Some OEMs wanting to be responsive 
to customers’ support needs while reducing their own costs of provid-
ing services have found it more financially appealing to offer new sub-
systems to replace older ones, providing their customers business cases 
for how upgrades can be more cost-effective over time.9 For example, 
in 2008 GE Aviation announced its intention to develop a more fuel-
efficient engine on the eCore concept to replace the CFM-56-5 and -7 
models on existing regional and business jets; Pratt & Whitney was 
developing a PurePower engine to compete in this re-engining market 
(Norris, 2008). Replacing subsystems may be less feasible for aerospace 
or industrial products with high capital costs than for electronic prod-
ucts. Hence, the extent to which substitution or interchangeability can 
9 In the extreme, it may be more cost-effective to retire an entire system than to upgrade or 
maintain it. Operating old equipment while introducing new increases the number of total 
parts to manage, including low-demand parts.
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reduce complexity and the number of low-demand parts depends on 
the expense of the unit being replaced.
Reducing complexity and the low-demand parts associated with 
it can also require the development and accurate maintenance of con-
figuration databases that record the kinds of parts, even down to the 
part number or NIIN, in installed equipment. Companies are very 
interested in assessing their installed base of products with particular 
customers. Those that sell directly to end-users rather than through 
distributors have a better chance of end-users sharing data on operat-
ing systems and configurations. Companies with management infor-
mation systems on customer relationships can assemble key data that 
can help them to anticipate customer demands and, in some cases, will 
position material in locations before demands occur. This can also be 
helpful for managing the distribution of low-demand parts that cannot 
be avoided through other strategies. Plans for positioning low-demand 
parts to locations that will be easier for shipping to the customer may 
also be developed, as could positioning them closer to express transpor-
tation and distribution systems. 
To assist manufacturers or suppliers in identifying preferred parts 
as a means of minimizing low-demand parts, centralized parts data-
bases can provide information on cost, reliability, preferred suppliers, 
preferred part numbers,10 and obsolete part numbers. Such databases 
may also show the relationship that parts have with other parts, includ-
ing the extent to which they can be interchanged or substituted. The 
value of such databases depends on the quality of their data, which 
means they must be updated continually with accurate information. 
Digitized data created from the beginning of newer systems are easier 
to maintain than legacy systems with multiple configurations that had 
their original data on paper or may be stored in incompatible electronic 
systems. 
10 As parts get older, manufacturers sometimes upgrade their materials or technologies to 
make them more economical, such as easier to dispose of, less expensive to manufacture, or 
more reliable. Parts that are more preferable to buy when purchasing a new part are referred 
to as “preferred part numbers.” The Air Force’s term for this is a “sub-group master” part.
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Strategy 3: Monitor and Manage Obsolescence by Identifying  
Soon-to-Be-Obsolete Parts, Technologies, and Processes
Another best practice in addressing low-demand parts is to monitor 
and manage obsolescence by identifying parts, technologies, and pro-
cesses that are being phased out or replaced. OEMs and suppliers may 
encourage design engineers to avoid using parts that could become dif-
ficult to obtain in the postproduction phase. Many commercial parts, 
especially for electronic equipment, have short shelf lives, as little as 18 
months, and obsolescence that cannot be avoided is managed through 
upgrades or new products, e.g., cell phones. Nevertheless, some aero-
space systems or industrial products may operate for decades, requiring 
much more attention to the management of obsolescence.
To manage obsolescence, companies create or access databases, 
such as those referred to in the design phase, with the most recent 
information on obsolete and preferred parts. This gives the company 
more time to decide how to adjust to discontinuation of a part. Market 
research and engineering teams can monitor technologies and pro-
cesses for trends indicating whether groups of parts are likely to be dif-
ficult to obtain in the future. By identifying obsolescence at the earliest 
time possible, manufacturers can avoid or better manage future low-
demand part supply problems. It may enter into discussions with the 
supplier about possible alternatives or look broadly at those parts that 
pose the greatest risk if no supply strategy is determined.
Phase II, Production and the Start of the Aftermarket: 
Committing Suppliers to Aftermarket Services and 
Ensuring Access to Technical Data
Once production, and the aftermarket, has commenced, options for 
ensuring availability of aftermarket parts may begin to constrict. 
Figure 3.1 notionally indicates this phase occurring between the 4th 
and 16th time periods of a product’s life cycle. There are two strategies 
that may be developed in this phase, including committing suppliers 
to aftermarket services in the postproduction phase of a product’s life 
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cycle, and securing potential access to technical data. We review each 
of these below.
Strategy 4: Commit Suppliers to Postproduction Aftermarket 
Services in the Production Contract
The production phase is the best time to have aligned supplier incen-
tives with goals for long-term support. In fact, buyers’ leverage over 
suppliers peaks just before award of the production contract. Commit-
ting suppliers to postproduction aftermarket services in the produc-
tion contract can help ensure long-term support of low-demand parts 
throughout the life cycle of a product. Buyers may also want to lever-
age the production contract award to ensure potential access to techni-
cal data for low-demand parts, which can help it develop alternative 
sources of supply should the original supplier exit the business or prove 
to be unresponsive.
Representatives of several companies we interviewed said their 
single most effective method of addressing low-demand parts was to 
secure, at the start of production, supplier commitment to aftermar-
ket services for a specified period of time in the postproduction phase. 
These explicit and binding commitments were included in the produc-
tion contracts. The primary incentive for suppliers to provide after-
market support is winning the production contract as well as future 
production business, as companies not willing to remain in the rela-
tionship beyond production are generally not considered to be viable 
candidates for new programs.
The emergence of performance-based logistics also provides rea-
sons to gain supplier commitment at the start of production to long-
term support in the postproduction phase. More manufacturers are 
offering product support agreements at the time of purchase. This 
requires that the supplier network be established during production 
and continue after production ends.11 Product support agreements pro-
vide incentives for manufacturers to require their suppliers to commit 
to aftermarket service support as part of their production contracts. 
11 According to Pennington (2005), in 2005 half of the total care contracts signed by GE 
Engine Services were agreed to as part of the contract for purchasing a new engine. 
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Because the availability of low-demand parts is critical to reaching per-
formance targets, there are incentives in these agreements to include 
support for them.
Most of our interviewees reported that their companies had 
developed corporate-wide combined measures of supplier performance 
for production and aftermarket services. The use of such corporate-
wide metrics, including performance on providing low-demand parts, 
provides incentives for supplier performance on these kinds of parts 
through links to larger, more profitable business volume. This linkage 
works best if performance metrics are integrated into the production 
award process and are taken into account when making the award. The 
same applies to programs that modify equipment and involve large-
dollar acquisitions.
Representatives of one company we interviewed said that although 
their firm did not have explicit contracts for aftermarket support writ-
ten during the production phase, it required suppliers to commit to 
providing support in the postproduction phase. It worked out the gen-
eral framework of the eventual contract in the production phase and 
made it clear it expected suppliers to figure out how to provide parts 
with relatively stable (if not declining) prices during postproduction, 
excluding inflation. Suppliers were given notice to determine the most 
efficient and effective means of planning for the postproduction phase 
while the product was in the production phase. Later, the company 
wrote a contract with options to allow for negotiation and greater spec-
ificity on those aspects with uncertainty, such as performance and price 
targets.
In committing suppliers to postproduction aftermarket services, 
enterprises may encourage suppliers to have contracts flow down to 
lower-tier suppliers as well as seek to work with suppliers on reducing 
lead times and improving performance. We address each of these tac-
tics below.
Flowing Down Long-Term Agreements with Lower-Tier Suppli-
ers. A supplier’s ability to provide low-demand parts over a long term 
depends on its own retention of its lower-tier suppliers. Lower-tier 
supply bases are typically larger than those for higher tiers, with more 
competitive and volatile markets as well. Our interviewees said that 
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lower-tier companies enter and exit their markets more frequently than 
higher-tier suppliers do. Lower-tier suppliers are generally smaller and 
have fewer resources to weather fluctuations in business volume. Once 
lower-tier companies stop producing a low-demand part, they are not 
likely to ramp up again to meet increased demand. Lower-tier com-
panies are also less concerned in satisfying the end-user, because they 
interact only with OEMs or other suppliers.
If OEMs and their tier-one suppliers have committed to long-
term aftermarket services support, they will have incentives to secure 
commitments from lower-tier suppliers. Some OEMs have found that 
their lower-tier suppliers are often unaware of plans to provide prod-
uct support for a prolonged period in the postproduction phase yet 
are inclined to maintain an aftermarket service relationship when 
approached with offers of long-term business (Berger and Williams, 
2006). Communicating aftermarket plans to lower-tier companies is 
a necessary but not sufficient step to ensure their participation. These 
plans must also anticipate lower-tier supplier participation in the low-
demand parts business, not just the lucrative, high-demand business.
Working with Suppliers to Reduce Lead Times and Improve Per-
formance. OEMs have several tools to use in helping suppliers reduce 
lead times and improve performance. Many low-demand items are 
supplied by OEMs who may have manufactured the original item or 
are better positioned than customers to find sources of supply or to 
secure technical data on the item. Customers may first approach the 
OEM for a low-demand item because its brand is often attached to all 
major parts on the equipment. OEMs thus have an incentive to protect 
their brands by finding a source of supply satisfying their customers. 
OEMs are also able to leverage the business they have with suppliers to 
provide performance incentives for the supply of parts, including low-
demand parts.
OEMs and other suppliers use objective, quantifiable perfor-
mance metrics to measure whether suppliers are meeting performance 
or contractual goals. As a best practice, OEMs work with their sup-
pliers to agree on the metrics and targets that OEMs expect them to 
achieve. These metrics, such as quality and on-time deliveries, are then 
measured to let both parties know how well the supplier is performing. 
Best Practices in Developing Supply Strategies for Low-Demand Service Parts    47
OEMs often collect these metrics across all activities performed by the 
supplier and can post results by product or aggregate them to strategic 
scores.
Our interviewees told us their companies use past performance 
metrics in conducting negotiations and awarding future contracts. 
The use of these metrics creates incentives for suppliers to provide sup-
port for all of their requirements, including low-demand ones. Private- 
sector companies do not have to ensure that these metrics are completely 
accurate before using them in negotiations and contract awards.12 
Another best practice to help suppliers perform better on low-
demand items is to quickly dispatch supplier development teams at the 
first sign of quality, cost, or performance problems. Such highlight-
ing of problem areas can elevate the sense of urgency with the sup-
plier and make difficult problems more likely to be resolved. OEMs 
are well equipped to analyze supply chain problems due to their broad 
experience with many suppliers, processes, and technologies. They 
generally have more analytical staff than their suppliers. These inves-
tigative teams include aftermarket services personnel who can specifi-
cally address low-demand support issues. Suppliers have an incentive 
to work with these teams because process improvements that benefit 
their immediate customer can also help them become more competi-
tive elsewhere.
In some cases, investigative visits can uncover problems that 
OEMs inadvertently cause their suppliers and which lead to perfor-
mance shortfalls. OEMs expect problems isolated to supplier practices 
to be remedied. Improvements in metrics will indicate whether the 
supplier has addressed issues that were causing supply problems.
Some OEMs offer training courses (sometimes for free) to key 
suppliers on applying Lean Manufacturing, Six Sigma, and other 
improvement practices to make their own operations more efficient 
and reduce variation in quality.13 Some of our interviewees noted that 
12 Nonetheless, it is in the interests of suppliers to help OEMs correct inaccuracies as they 
occur and in the interests of the OEMs to have accurate metrics.
13 Lean Manufacturing derives from the Toyota Production System. It is the collection of 
methodologies and techniques to “optimize time, human resources, assets, and productiv-
48    Best Practices in Developing Proactive Supply Strategies for Low-Demand Parts
if their suppliers were not already proficient in Lean Manufacturing or 
Six Sigma principles, they would be required to take training as a con-
dition for continued business. 
Strategy 5: Secure Access to Technical Data in the Production 
Contract
Written technical data—i.e., detailed drawings, specifications, process 
descriptions, and technical databases—provide the blueprints needed 
for manufacturing new parts or repairing and servicing existing parts. 
Companies offering aftermarket services or customers seeking such 
services need to own or have access to technical data so that they 
can develop alternative sources of supply or repair should the origi-
nal source leave the industry or its performance become unsatisfactory. 
Traditional firms that design products and outsource their fabrication 
own much of their technical data. As firms become more virtual and 
outsource both design and manufacturing to their suppliers, they may 
own less of the technical data associated with their products. Private-
sector companies that incorporate technology owned by their suppli-
ers have an analogous issue as the Air Force by not necessarily having 
access to these data. The best time to negotiate access to technical data 
is before the production contract award, when competition still exists. 
Once a supplier has been selected, it becomes a sole-source provider of 
the product’s unique parts and has incentives to make access to techni-
cal data prohibitively expensive to keep third-party providers out of the 
aftermarket.
Technical data can be very expensive to buy, particularly if access 
to them has not been negotiated prior to the award of the production 
contract. OEMs are not inclined to share technical data without com-
pensation, because doing so can lower the cost for competitors entering 
the market. As products mature and are modified, OEMs charge fees 
ity, while improving the quality level of products and services to their customers” (Becker, 
undated).
Six Sigma is a methodology that uses information and statistical data analysis to identify 
and eliminate defects to quantities less than six standard deviations from the mean and 
the specification limit, e.g., fewer than 3.4 defects per million opportunities. It is used to 
improve any process. 
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to update and maintain their technical data. For very old products, 
first-time demands may require the OEM to look for the associated 
technical data that may not be digitized and available only in hard 
copy, if at all. A customer seeking such information during postpro-
duction may be frustrated if the purchase of technical data was not part 
of the original acquisition or production contract. If the supplier’s tech-
nical data are not made available to the OEM or cannot be found, the 
process of reengineering the part can be time-consuming and expen-
sive.14 This underscores the importance of acquiring access to such data 
no later than the production phase of an item’s life cycle.
Companies can minimize these problems by stipulating in the 
production contract provisions for addressing the technical data or by 
tying future business to the transfer of current technical data. Our 
interviewees told us their firms had agreements for their suppliers to 
transfer the ownership of technical data to them after the end of pro-
duction or that they otherwise expected suppliers to sell them, accord-
ing to terms and conditions set in the production contract, or provide 
them access to technical data as a condition of good faith and doing 
future business together. Our interviewees added that these strategies 
work best when their enterprise is a key customer of the supplier. Com-
panies sometimes buy the data and hold it in reserve to create an incen-
tive for the supplier to perform well. Companies have the most lever-
age to arrange the purchase of technical data before the award of the 
production contract.15 
14 McDermott, Shearer, and Tomczykowski (1999, p. 1-1) note that the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics (DUSD(L)) indicates that the average 
cost to redesign a circuit card to eliminate obsolete components is $250,000 . . . . The Air 
Force is reprogramming $81 million for the F-22 program to purchase obsolete or soon-
to-be-out-of-production parts and to redesign assemblies to accept commercial parts. An 
avionics manufacturer for the commercial airlines spent $600,000 to replace an obsolete 
Intel chip. The F-16 program has spent $500 million to redesign an obsolete radar. In 
fiscal year 1997, the KC-130F/R program spent $264,000 on a life of type (LOT) buy as 
a resolution for one obsolete logic device.
15 Our interviewees said that the cost of acquiring the technical data was generally less than 
not having it later on. Several said they would not consider not securing access or ownership 
of technical data before awarding a production contract with a major supplier.
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Companies told us they were subject to the same limitations as 
the Air Force when it comes to technical data. That is, technical data 
are not available in the private sector if the designs and procedures have 
been developed privately. Knowing the worth of these data is more 
straightforward in the private sector. Specified operational cost tar-
gets will constrain what suppliers can charge, and suppliers that over-
charge run the risk of losing future business. Indeed, we were told that 
suppliers no longer wanting to manufacture very old parts may give 
the technical data to the OEM/customer so that the OEM can find 
another supplier. These private-sector practices seem rare in public- 
sector markets.
Phase III, Postproduction: Providing Incentives for or 
Developing New Sources of Parts
In the third, postproduction phase of a product’s life cycle, supply 
options for low-demand parts rapidly dwindle if a supply strategy is 
not in place. Figure 3.1 indicates this phase as occurring after produc-
tion ceases on an item, or about the 16th or 17th time period of its life 
cycle, until the end of the product’s life cycle. Business volume for a 
spare or repair item associated with a product may now comprise only 
aftermarket service requirements, with few or very low demands that 
are highly intermittent and consequently variable. These are depicted 
notionally by small, black peaks in Figure 3.1. Once the OEM or sup-
pliers decide to end support of these economically low-performing 
parts, they become obsolete. Lower-tier suppliers who might otherwise 
provide them may exit the business altogether.
Modified or updated subsystems that use common parts or fit 
into more than one equipment type can help extend an item’s avail-
ability in the same way that overlapping production of two products, 
as shown in Figure 3.2, may extend production of a common item for 
them, or shorten the aftermarket period of low demand for an item. 
Business volume for modifications may be less than that of initial pro-
duction because modifications may be phased in over time, as in prod-
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uct recalls or modernization programs, or because not all customers 
will modify or update product subsystems.
If an agreement is not already in place for aftermarket support, 
end-users should determine supplier availability for aftermarket sup-
port. More companies are trying to identify supply sources for all 
their products and product parts, although even those implementing 
best practices say they find it difficult to identify sources for many, 
if not every, part of their legacy systems, particularly parts with low 
demands. Nonetheless, the companies we interviewed were all moving 
in that direction. Companies may analyze potential supply problems 
by comparing the potential risk of not having a supply source with 
projected requirement quantities and total cost. In other words, firms 
may compare the potential problems resulting from low-demand part 
failures sidelining critical equipment (such as that for airport screening 
or medical diagnostics) with the cost of developing a supply source for 
some parts that may ultimately not be needed.
More companies are also analyzing how important they are to 
their suppliers to better understand the likely priority and responsive-
ness their future requirements will be given. Important customers are 
more likely to receive support for economically unattractive require-
ments, such as low-demand parts.
Should companies determine that they are relatively unimportant 
to a particular supplier, they may decide to move more of their future 
workload from that supplier to other, preferred suppliers to receive 
better support over a product’s life cycle. This option is not always fea-
sible during production or postproduction, or when few suppliers are 
available. Nonetheless, companies may find that such analysis helps 
them better leverage their business where they can and align supplier 
incentives with their own goals in seeking the best long-term support 
possible.
Private-sector companies identify four strategies to ensure avail-
ability of low-demand parts for aftermarket support of their installed 
product bases. These include providing incentives for supply of these 
parts, developing a new supplier of them, purchasing or retiring prod-
ucts for parts, or buying a lifetime supply of parts before a supplier 
leaves the business. We review each of them below.
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Strategy 6: Provide Incentives for Supply of Low-Demand Parts
Our interviewees reported several different means their companies use 
to ensure that their suppliers have incentives to continue providing 
low-demand parts.
One such means is to guarantee future business volume across 
groups of low-demand parts rather than setting minimum desired 
quantities for each part. Companies are increasingly combining parts 
and other material requirements to increase their leverage over them. 
Low-demand parts are suitable for such a strategy to the extent that 
groups of them have common production equipment, skills, or material.
A second means is to combine requirements for low-demand parts 
with those having medium and high demands. The more important 
the buyer is to the supplier, the more likely that the supplier may be 
willing to accept an arrangement linking economically attractive busi-
ness with unattractive, less-profitable business. Representatives of one 
company we interviewed, however, discounted this strategy, saying its 
suppliers would likely increase prices on all parts to minimize the risk 
inherent with the low-demand ones were it to pursue such a strategy.
Finally, several interviewees told us they took support of low-
demand service parts into consideration when awarding new produc-
tion contracts. Some buyers said they considered past performance 
evaluations for suppliers when awarding or negotiating new work. For 
one company, only a few cases of awarding business to a new supplier 
instead of the current one based on past performance issues sufficed for 
the entire supplier base to take past performance seriously. This option 
works best in a competitive environment.
If the buyer is not an important customer and the workload is a 
nuisance to the supplier or no other good alternatives currently exist, 
the buyer may have few options other than to pay a higher price to 
make the business more attractive. A proactive supply strategy would 
seek to avoid such a situation through the strategies outlined above or 
even by developing new suppliers if necessary, assuming the buyer had 
access to the necessary technical data and other necessary inputs.
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Strategy 7: If a Supplier Does Not Currently Exist, Develop One
Some parts have been out of production so long that the supplier may 
no longer exist, either because the supplier has long quit production, 
been acquired by another company, or gone out of business altogether.
If the original supplier has been out of production for many years, 
it may not be interested in making the investment necessary to produce 
a few quantities, even if enticed with premium payments. If the part 
cannot be substituted with a similar one, the buyer may prefer to find 
or develop a new supplier for the old part rather than replace an entire 
subsystem or piece of equipment.
If the buyer has the necessary technical data and tooling, it may 
try to find a new supplier, preferably one that is already providing the 
enterprise other parts and has an incentive to take on additional work, 
even if economically unattractive. Some manufacturers have found 
or developed “cottage industry” suppliers that specialize in producing 
low-demand parts. These suppliers are able to produce parts in small 
lot sizes.
If the buyer does not have the necessary technical data or tooling, 
then its options are more limited. Companies lacking the appropriate 
technical data or tooling may approach the original suppliers to buy 
or gain access to it. Representatives of several companies told us they 
let suppliers know that any lack of cooperation in providing this could 
affect their prospects for future business.
In some cases, OEMs may purposely choose to develop a new sup-
plier to replace an existing, more expensive source of supply. As prod-
ucts age and demand for their service parts begins to decrease, OEMs 
that may have produced parts may decide that the cost of continuing to 
produce parts that now have low demand is too high and will therefore 
try to find lower-cost suppliers specializing in low-volume, high-quality 
manufacturing to produce them. These low-volume suppliers may be 
small businesses with lower overhead costs and fewer engineering or 
program management personnel. Such suppliers may have demon-
strated an ability to produce small, high-quality lots using specialized 
processes and materials, and to reduce set-up times for small lots of 
low-demand parts. The workforce for these suppliers must be trained to 
manufacture a few pieces at a time and have versatile skills. Such small 
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businesses might also help buyers fulfill socio-economic goals, such as 
the federal government has, for procurement from such businesses.
Representatives of one company told us they looked for suppliers 
with the “right” attitude, willing to make investments, develop new 
capabilities, and retrain their workers. This company would work with 
these suppliers to bring them up to the level needed for producing low-
demand parts.
To make low-demand business more attractive to new suppliers, 
the business can rely on economies of scope so that various low-demand 
parts can be produced with similar resources. To utilize this approach, 
requirements for low-demand parts would need to be aggregated and 
sourced as related groups. To be manufactured on the same line or 
facility, a group of parts should share similar processes, materials, and 
tooling, and require similar labor skills. Because of the uncertainties 
surrounding actual demands of particular low-demand parts, contracts 
with new suppliers should be negotiated for a guaranteed minimum 
volume for groups of parts, rather than for individual parts. In this 
case, price may be negotiated for a basket of parts, which as a group 
have a greater probability of demand than their constituent items.16 
Buyers may also seek to increase leverage for these parts through 
larger, longer-term contracts. Some OEMs have been able to minimize 
cost to their suppliers by providing them access to their own contracts 
for raw materials and piece parts. When ordering off these contracts, 
suppliers must show that the requirement is due to the OEM’s orders.
Over time, an OEM’s cost per unit for managing low-demand 
parts may increase. This may lead it to outsource the search for and 
management of suppliers to enterprises that are knowledgeable about 
industry markets and practices for particular parts. In some cases, the 
16 Supply chain management of low-demand parts is complicated by their off-and-on demand. 
Traditional approaches of trying to forecast and buy “just enough” low-demand parts lead to 
excess inventory because many have no demands in any given year. Private-sector companies 
recognized that lean inventories—which reduce these underutilized stocks—require in-place, 
proactive supply strategies that can quickly react to demand or near-term forecasts. As an 
example, a supplier may manufacture a part up to a point and then only complete the work, 
such as painting it a certain color, once an actual demand is known. These kinds of parts also 
affect operational readiness and are important to achieving equipment performance goals.
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OEM may prefer to directly contract with the new suppliers, partic-
ularly small business suppliers, to be able to claim a direct relation-
ship with small business companies, but at the same time to outsource 
day-to-day management of this relationship to another company with 
lower overhead costs. One company said this approach permitted it to 
find new sources of supply for low-demand parts, reduce its manage-
ment costs, free its personnel to focus on its higher-value core business, 
and meet a government requirement to subcontract to small business 
companies.
To ensure supplier diversity in outsourcing supplier management, 
manufacturers may write two types of contracts: one with the manager 
of low-demand suppliers and another with the suppliers themselves. A 
company may pay its manager of suppliers administrative and manage-
ment fees and also pay small suppliers for the low-demand parts. Par-
ticularly for government business, this permits the company to claim 
subcontract status with the small business providing low-demand 
parts while allocating transaction costs to suppliers with lower over-
head rates. Direct contracts with suppliers allow the large company to 
receive credit for subcontracting business to small (or diverse) suppliers. 
Terms and conditions in supplier contracts make them accountable to 
both the large company and to the supplier management firm.
Strategy 8: Purchase or Retire Whole Products Just for Parts
If parts are not available through suppliers or they are too expensive to 
reengineer, buyers may purchase whole products for their parts. This 
can be an economically viable source of low-demand or obsolete parts 
for old, inexpensive products or for products whose pieces of equip-
ment have been or are expected to be retired. Buyers will incur some 
costs in acquiring and storing the whole products and in harvesting 
their parts.
Southern Air, which operates 17 B-747-200 freighter aircraft, pro-
vides an example of cannibalization for aviation parts. It buys older 
B-747s to cannibalize for parts, finding the practice to be more cost-
effective and to result in shorter lead times than buying parts from 
the OEM (Dillion, 2004). The airline analyzed prospective aircraft for 
cannibalization beforehand, including their operating hours, age of 
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parts, and proper Federal Aviation Administration parts certification 
document.
The success of this approach depends on how well the parts to be 
cannibalized match end-user requirements. Engine, avionics, and land-
ing gear components are considered the most valuable parts to can-
nibalize. Cannibalization also entails several costs, including that for 
ferrying transportation and cataloging and warehousing parts. Buyers 
may recoup some of these costs by selling excess parts to a third party.
When only one customer owns all existing equipment, cannibal-
ization is available only through the retirement of products. NASA had 
announced plans to retire, rather than to overhaul, the space shuttle 
Atlantis in 2008 so that it can be a “parts donor” for the remaining 
two shuttles in service; however, plans now call for the three orbiters 
to fly until 2010 (Halvorsen, 2006; Chaplain, 2008). The Air Force 
stores older aircraft at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona to use 
as sources of reclaimed parts, drones for training, or sales to friendly 
foreign governments. The Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration 
Center there stores about 5,000 excess aircraft, such as the F-100, 
F-104, F-15, F-16, C-135, UH-1, C-5, and B-52, used by the military 
services or other national agencies.17
Strategy 9: Buy Lifetime Supply of Parts Before the Supplier Exits 
the Business
Should a customer not wish to face the costly prospects of developing 
an alternative supplier or buying whole products for a few parts, it may 
seek to buy a lifetime supply of parts. This is typically done before a 
last-known supplier exits a business.
Buying a lifetime supply of low-demand parts has the direct costs 
of buying large amounts of material beyond any immediate need and 
maintaining the inventory. It has opportunity costs of spending what 
might be significant resources—certainly in the millions, if not bil-
lions—that might be used elsewhere. It also has costs to store the items, 
as DLA charges the services for warehouse storage.
17 See Davis-Monthan Air Force Base (2008).
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Purchasing a lifetime supply of parts, or an “end-of-life” buy, is 
generally considered an unattractive option due to the great uncer-
tainties and costs involved. The choice is especially difficult for low-
demand parts, given their high number of part numbers and demand 
uncertainties over the lifetime of a product. These estimates are espe-
cially difficult for parts that have a very-low-demand history. Some 
companies faced with this dilemma decide to buy an end-of-life quan-
tity of spare parts.18 Others decline these buys and try to manage their 
inventories more carefully, seeking to buy parts from competitors, or 
to cannibalize parts should demands exceed expectations. Companies 
using this strategy have to balance the cost of retaining low-demand 
part inventories against the chance of disappointing customers in the 
future.
Summary of Private-Sector Strategies
As discussed above, where a product is in its life cycle determines to 
a large degree the strategies available to assure supply of low-demand 
parts. The best options for ensuring long-term aftermarket support are 
in the earliest stages of a product’s life cycle. Table 3.1 summarizes each 
strategy.
In the next chapter we discuss specific strategies the Air Force 
may use to manage low-demand parts in its operations.
18 The Air Force has made many such buys and has many parts with zero or low demands 
each year. Lifetime buys are seen as necessary if the supplier is exiting the market and the Air 
Force does not believe it has any more cost-effective option for obtaining these parts.
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Table 3.1 
Low-Demand Parts Supply Strategies Availability by Product  
Life-Cycle Phase
Benefit Challenges
Phase I: Design and Develop
1. Involve buyers and suppliers 
in the design of new systems, 
products, and parts






2. reduce complexity by using 
common subsystems and parts
Minimize unique parts Maximizing 
performance 
objectives
3. Monitor and manage 
obsolescence 




4. Commit suppliers to 
postproduction aftermarket 






5. ensure potential access to 
technical data
oeM incentives to ensure 
alternative sources of supply
Cost justification in 
acquisition phase
Phase III: Postproduction
6. Provide incentives for 
supply of low-demand parts
Maintain supply chain 
continuity
Cost
7. If supplier no longer exists, 
develop a new one




8. Purchase or retire whole 
products just for parts





9. Buy a lifetime supply of 
parts before the supplier exits 
the business






Applying Best Practices for Low-Demand Parts  
to the Air Force
As noted in the previous chapter, best practices for low-demand parts 
depend greatly on where the product is in its life cycle. In this chapter 
we discuss how these supply strategies can be applied to the Air Force, 
and what strategies the Air Force is already pursuing for products in 
design and development, production, or postproduction.
The Air Force is different from private-sector buyers of expensive 
equipment. As noted earlier, many of its parts are specialized, incorpo-
rating expensive materials, are sole-source with only one buyer, have 
long lead times, and are subject to technology obsolescence. It has a 
very wide breadth of low-demand items with high unit prices and a 
need for reserve stocks to support a surge in operations. Having enough 
low-demand parts in inventory is very expensive and not economically 
viable as a strategy. Many low-demand parts will not be demanded, but 
those that are might ground aircraft if they are unavailable.
Developing proactive supply strategies for low-demand parts can 
occur at any time during the life cycle of a system. The companies 
that we interviewed were looking into developing strategies for low-
demand parts for all of their systems and equipment to avoid buying 
inventory. Some of the solutions that apply at one phase of the life cycle 
are not available later on. The level of effort with which low-demand 
supply strategies are pursued depends on how much the low-demand 
part affects equipment uptime, its expense, and the cost of the supply 
strategies themselves. The extent to which these best practices can be 
applied to the Air Force environment is an essential factor.
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Design and Develop
Prior to the design and development of a new or modified weapon 
system, the government goes through a well-structured process for set-
ting requirements. It typically awards contracts to at least two compa-
nies for concept development, specific product research and develop-
ment, and designs to meet particular requirements, before selecting one 
to make the product. This process may occur in stages, with compa-
nies required to include logistics and support considerations in designs 
that currently vary widely in their specifics.1 The process of setting 
the requirement and conducting negotiations is more structured in the 
military than in the commercial world. Competition is always required 
for military programs unless particular conditions are met.
Several Air Force and DoD initiatives are changing the process 
for designing and developing products, including support processes for 
them. AFMC’s Product Support Campaign initiative has been trans-
forming the practices and processes of managing the total life cycle of 
weapon systems to establish and maintain their readiness and opera-
tional capability. The DoD requires that program managers consider 
supportability and life-cycle costs in the same way it considers perfor-
mance and schedule in making program decisions. The Develop and 
Sustain Warfighting Systems (D&SWS) initiative is also seeking to 
bring life-cycle support considerations and logistics as well as ALC per-
sonnel into the acquisition phase, similar to the ways commercial firms 
have sought to include end-user considerations in their efforts to reduce 
low-demand parts (Keiper, 2006).
We discuss below more specific initiatives the Air Force and DoD 
have undertaken or could undertake.
1 The Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-23, signed 22 May 
2009) requires the DoD to estimate the baseline for operations and sustainment costs of 
major defense acquisition programs, which should raise the importance of sustainment costs 
during acquisition. It calls for acquisition strategies that ensure competition throughout the 
life cycle of these major weapon systems, such as buying technical data, ensuring competi-
tion, or the option to compete, at the prime and subcontractor level, etc.
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Involve Supply Chain Managers and Commodity Councils Early in 
Product and Parts Acquisition
ALCs could fulfill the same role in devising supply strategies for low-
demand parts that buyers offer in the commercial design phase, given 
that ALCs are responsible for developing and managing product and 
logistics support of fielded systems. As a result of supporting many 
legacy systems, ALCs have developed expertise that could prove valu-
able in developing program office logistics requirements and selection 
criteria for suppliers of new and modified products. AFMC supply 
chain managers understand the effect of low-demand parts supply on 
weapon system availability. Members of AFMC commodity councils 
routinely face the challenges of assuring supplies of parts for systems in 
their postproduction phase. They are familiar with the performance of 
aftermarket suppliers and how their structure and behavior may differ 
from manufacturing organizations in the same firm. Their experiences 
can provide insights in developing supply strategies for low-demand 
parts early in the program for a product and in shaping the supplier 
aftermarket phase for the new product, system, or parts.
Reduce Complexity by Using Common Subsystems and Parts and 
the Proactive Management of Obsolescence 
Product designs that incorporate parts used in other products can 
help reduce the potential number of low-demand parts. Fewer unique 
parts also decrease the chance that failure of any given part will affect 
an aircraft’s mission capability. Major Air Force fighter, bomber, and 
space programs typically involve new technologies that go far beyond 
incremental changes to existing ones. As a result, new Air Force pro-
grams may have few opportunities to use standard parts or subsystems 
common to other programs. Still, some opportunities may exist, par-
ticularly at the subsystem and assembly levels.
The Air Force has more influence over its markets than commer-
cial companies have over theirs, and can create requirements for new, 
upgraded, or standardized products that maximize common items on 
its platforms. In 2004, for example, the Support Equipment Commod-
ity Council at AFMC determined that 190 unique oscilloscope stock 
numbers could be reduced to three common configurations (Koenig, 
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2005). The Air Force can encourage OEMs to avoid using parts, tech-
nologies, or processes more prone to obsolescence. On the other hand, 
more use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) electronics would mean 
that obsolescence of parts would be influenced by commercial markets 
instead of military markets. Commercial markets are typically larger 
than military ones for COTS technologies and are quicker to upgrade 
to newer technologies over time.
DoD has developed several resources to address obsolescence 
directly for its legacy systems. One is the Government-Industry Data 
Exchange Program (GIDEP). The GIDEP is chartered by the Joint 
Logistics Commanders and is a clearinghouse for sharing a wide range 
of technical information about programs and technologies of interest 
to the buyers and suppliers of DoD weapon systems. Its members can 
access the Diminishing Manufacturing Sources Shared Data Ware-
house, which is being developed by DLA and posts part numbers and 
national stock numbers that face obsolescence.2
A second resource DoD has developed to manage obsolescence of 
electronic parts is the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA). The 
DMEA is a government laboratory capable of designing and develop-
ing integrated circuits and specialized microelectronic devices. It has 
negotiated intellectual property agreements with technology providers 
that allow the government to “design, prototype, and test new micro-
electronic components and systems” (DMEA, 2002).
The presence of sustainment considerations in the requirements 
process indicates that the Air Force should plan for long-term parts 
support as early as possible in the product life cycle. As we have noted, 
buyers such as the Air Force have greater leverage in ensuring the 
supply of low-demand parts earlier in the product life cycle. Specify-
ing long-term logistics requirements prior to the production contract 
also permits suppliers to pass incentives to their lower-tier suppliers for 
long-term support commitment.
2 Other information on the GIDEP website includes engineering data on parts, materials, 
and processes; metrology data for test and inspection equipment; product information data 
on part attribute changes; reliability and maintainability data and practices; and urgent help 
requests regarding sources of supply as well as other requests for information.
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The emergence of CLS and PBL contracts has increased incen-
tives for companies and their engineers to address reliability and main-
tainability issues with the systems supported by these contracts, includ-
ing better supply strategies for the low-demand parts. OEMs are keenly 
interested in developing PBL arrangements for a variety of reasons, 
including their stable, long-term revenues. Some PBL contracts based 
on FAR Part 12 regulations are not subject to the same cost and pric-
ing transparency issues as FAR Part 15 contracts and may be lucra-
tive arrangements for OEMs, even though they may possibly reduce 
the Air Force’s sustainment total costs for these particular aircraft 
systems. (Earlier we noted that many commercial manufacturers and 
retailers make higher profits on service arrangements than on sales of 
their products.) Under such arrangements, patterned after “power-
by-the-hour” arrangements pioneered by Rolls-Royce, the contractor 
agrees to provide sufficient logistics support for a specified number of 
flights or missions or operating hours and the Air Force agrees to pay 
the contractor fixed fees for each flight (Tripp, 1998). These arrange-
ments often include program-unique attributes, such as how replenish-
ment spares requirements are computed and approved, who owns the 
spares, where they are stored, and what is considered beyond the scope 
of the contract (Mechem, 2006). Under such arrangements, OEMs 
can increase their profits if they provide parts that fail less often or 
parts, many of which can be low demand, to repair lines to minimize 
delays in completing repairs. Whether DoD is saving costs through 
such arrangements, however, has not yet been adequately demonstrated 
(Solis, 2005).
Production
The Air Force typically awards production contracts for a new product 
or subsystem to a single systems integrator OEM. The systems inte-
grator OEM that is awarded the production contract uses design and 
manufacturing processes developed in the previous stage to begin pro-
duction. Some time after the start of production, logistics capabilities 
develop.
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In the past, the Air Force conducted most of its repairs at its own 
organic depots, with some contractors designated as the primary source 
of repair for items with proprietary technology or systems with low den-
sities. Some contractors also functioned as secondary sources of repair 
for items with large variation in demands or those needed for overflow 
work that depots could not assume. The balance between repair work 
done at Air Force depots and that done by contractors has shifted over 
time. In 1982, DoD required the services to allocate no more than 30 
percent of their repair workload to contractors; today, no more than 
50 percent of all repair dollars can be spent with repair contractors, 
including PBL repair workloads (Cook, Ausink, and Roll, 2005).
Although a substantial amount of Air Force repair work must still 
be done by the Air Force itself, the Air Force also must address low-
demand supply issues with its producers and suppliers for other repairs. 
The means available to it are similar to those available to private busi-
nesses, including developing contracts that commit the supplier to 
postproduction sustainment and creating incentives for the supply of 
low-demand parts.
Develop Contracts That Commit the Supplier to Postproduction 
Sustainment
As noted above, a contract that commits the contractor to postproduc-
tion support of parts, including low-demand ones, should stand along-
side the production contract. OEMs have a greater incentive to commit 
to such support before the production contract has been awarded, par-
ticularly if they are competing with others for it. Contracts for weapon 
system sustainment can range from complete contractor support to 
support of particular subsystems, parts, or services. The key to reach-
ing an agreement on postproduction support in the production con-
tract is to agree to a set of rules that govern how to establish logistics 
support details (such as quality, price, and delivery) when more data 
are available on how the product is performing and its actual support 
requirements.
The Air Force has traditionally given higher priority to acquisition 
performance, cost, and schedule in determining weapon system pro-
duction awards, with logistics considerations incorporated at varying 
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degrees. This is changing.3 The production contract for the Joint Strike 
Fighter was one of the first to make logistics support an important com-
petitive criterion for the award decision. D&SWS should also elevate 
the importance of sustainment in acquisition processes and decisions. 
The best way to learn how the private sector writes these contracts is 
to benchmark a few companies that have been successful in providing 
better support of low-demand parts for less total cost.
Create Incentives for Supplying Low-Demand Parts by Tracking 
Supplier Performance
Performance metrics can help an enterprise evaluate suppliers’ support 
performance as well as detect problems that need to be resolved, such 
as those regarding low-demand parts. Metrics that integrate support 
and production create incentives for OEMs and suppliers to provide 
support for low-demand parts.
Private-sector companies develop weights to apply to production 
performance variables. They do not always share these with suppliers, 
to prevent suppliers from “gaming” the system. Several interviewees 
told us that their companies base future awards on overall performance 
scores, such as automatic contract extensions or incentive awards. They 
said suppliers seem to prefer automatic contract extensions, because 
they reduce bidding costs and provide a strong incentive to perform 
well during the current phase of the contract. The Air Force has devel-
oped an extensive array of metrics to track contractor performance, 
although we are not aware of an integrated Air Force metric that aggre-
gates sustainment and acquisition performance to one score.4
3 Total Life Cycle Cost Systems Management, which requires that sustainment costs be 
considered more explicitly in the production phase of the acquisition of a weapon system, 
could make the buying of technical data more likely than in the recent past. Programs often 
reallocate monies earmarked for technical data to cover cost overruns during development 
and/or production, which essentially derails plans to buy technical data.
4 The Joint Supplier Scorecard may offer the best opportunity for measuring suppliers 
across the acquisition and sustainment interface. It provides a common definition of metrics 
for (1) administrative lead time, (2) production lead time, (3) on-time delivery, (4) quality, 
(5) material readiness, and (6) cost.
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Postproduction
As noted earlier, buyers have fewer options for supply strategies in the 
postproduction phase of a life cycle for a product than in the earlier 
phases. Nevertheless, some options are available, particularly for orga-
nizations such as the Air Force that have a large spend with suppliers 
that provide low-demand parts and could, through that spend, create 
incentives for suppliers to provide low-demand support more cost-
effectively in the postproduction phase. We review below the options 
the Air Force may develop by proactively working with suppliers or by 
employing strategies to develop new sources of supply.
Proactively Work with Suppliers to Assure Long-Term Supply
We earlier found that most of the low-demand parts that the Air Force 
purchases are from its top suppliers (as ranked by dollars), and that a 
higher proportion of contracts for low-demand parts than for other 
parts are purchase orders. Using long-term contracts (e.g., 3 to 5 years) 
rather than purchase orders for such items can provide greater incen-
tives for suppliers to maintain capability for supporting low-demand 
parts. Long-term contracts may also increase the Air Force’s leverage 
for these items, especially if they are aggregated with more lucrative 
medium- and high-demand requirements. Analysis would be required 
to identify the right parts groupings and which organization ought to 
take the lead for writing the contract. The companies we interviewed 
said they did not see costs rise because of highly competitive markets 
and appropriately large market bundles. For these kinds of analyses to 
yield useful information, visibility to good cost and process data would 
also be needed.
Working with suppliers to assure supplies of low-demand parts 
may require the Air Force to address supply problems more proactively 
and to help suppliers identify root causes of quality, cost, and deliv-
ery problems. Unfortunately, contracting personnel told us, govern-
ment regulations constrain the Air Force from involving itself infor-
mally in supplier operations. Contract relationships further complicate 
this issue, with many contracts having multiple participants (including 
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other government agencies, such as DLA) external to the Air Force and 
outside its control.
Having multiple participants in supplier relationships makes it 
difficult for the Air Force to coordinate contractor incentives for long-
term support of low-demand parts. It also makes it more difficult to 
develop metrics combining sustainment and acquisition measures.
Still, the Air Force can make low-demand parts and support for 
them more attractive to suppliers if it can link their supply to business 
for other, more profitable parts. In the past, some suppliers have pre-
ferred to contract with the Air Force for quantities of parts that required 
approval only at lower management levels, effectively increasing sup-
plier power and profits. Commodity councils have helped reverse this 
trend by moving the development of supply strategies and approval of 
their purchases to the level of AFMC headquarters management (U.S. 
Air Force, 2004).
The development of commodity councils and spend analyses have 
made it easier for the Air Force to analyze cost and supply risk for its 
commodities and to identify those that are low, medium, and high 
demand. The establishment of commodity councils and spend analy-
ses have also permitted the Air Force opportunities to identify where 
to target incentives, where feasible, for assuring supply of low-demand 
parts. Spend analyses coupled with low-demand parts analyses can, 
for example, indicate whether the Air Force should increase total busi-
ness with certain suppliers that can assure supply of low-demand (and 
other) parts, or whether it may need to pay higher prices for such parts 
in order to reduce total costs for their equipment and improve overall 
performance.
Employ Other Strategies When Original Suppliers Are Not Available 
or Economical
When leverage and options are more limited, the Air Force must deter-
mine whether it has the most leverage within DoD over a supplier of 
low-demand parts or whether DLA or another service might. If other 
organizations have more leverage with the supplier, then the Air Force 
may wish to secure low-demand parts through these other supplier 
relationships by developing joint contracts that add Air Force items 
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to larger contracts. Spotting such opportunities would require rou-
tinely analyzing DoD-wide spend at a detailed level. Now that DLA 
buys reparable parts for the services, the Air Force needs to be analyz-
ing supply strategies for parts that are bought on its behalf by other 
organizations.
A part may, as noted earlier, be low-demand because it has failed 
for the first time in many years of service as a consequence of aging 
and long use. This may be an increasingly common problem for the Air 
Force as its aircraft continue to age.
If the original supplier cannot be found or is no longer produc-
ing the part, the Air Force may need to develop or qualify a new sup-
plier. If the part is mechanical and can reasonably be reengineered, 
the Air Force may wish to produce it in an organic backshop. Many 
low-demand parts, however, such as electronic components, require a 
contract source of supply or repair.
If the Air Force can gain access to technical data for a low-demand 
part, it may be possible to develop a low-volume supplier to produce it. 
The Air Force will need to group these parts in ways that are economi-
cally feasible for suppliers to manufacture or repair, to be produced 
by companies that have demonstrated abilities to produce small lots 
economically.
If the parts are obsolete and technical data are not available, then 
the Air Force may need to cannibalize equipment for low-demand 
parts. Air Force policy discourages cannibalization for fleets that are 
not being retired or replaced.
In the past, the Air Force has sometimes purchased a lifetime 
supply of low-demand parts when parts become obsolete when manu-
facturers quit producing or supporting the part. Commercial firms, as 
we discussed, find this option unattractive because of the uncertainty 
associated with predicting lifetime needs. Some companies, as we also 
discussed, have opted to buy less than that needed for forecast demand, 
relying on careful management of remaining supplies, replacing parts 
with modified subsystems, or calculating the cost of maintaining addi-
tional inventories against the possibility of losing new business from 
disappointed current customers. Companies with PBL contracts must 
think about similar issues. Many legacy Air Force subsystems are too 
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expensive to replace, making the option of replacing parts with modi-





The Air Force’s options for developing supply strategies for low-demand 
parts depend greatly on where its products are in their life cycles. 
Options dwindle as a product moves from its design phase to its pro-
duction phase to its postproduction phase. The most favorable time for 
the Air Force to develop long-term supply strategies for low-demand 
parts is both during the design phase and at the beginning of the pro-
duction phase before the award of the production contract. Integrating 
logistics plans and commitments in the production contract aligns sup-
plier incentives with buyer goals and minimizes the total cost to the Air 
Force and its suppliers for assuring long-term supplies of low-demand 
parts. In the postproduction phase, suppliers at all levels wield more 
leverage than in earlier phases and are less inclined to provide less prof-
itable low-demand parts. We summarize below actions the Air Force 
should take in each phase of a product’s life cycle to assure support of 
low-demand parts.
We note that the Air Force operates many legacy aircraft, which 
means most of its fleet is postproduction and faces technology obsoles-
cence, diminishing sources of supply and repair, and more low-demand 
failures than younger fleets. Few systems are still in the pre-award phase 
(e.g., the replacement tanker). Even so, many subsystems continue to 
be modernized and upgraded. To the extent that these programs are 
competed, opportunities exist to apply some of these principles even to 
legacy aircraft.
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Phase I: Design
The Air Force could involve its sustainment representatives early in the 
design phase of products and parts to incorporate reliability and main-
tainability concerns. These representatives could also use their experi-
ence as supply chain managers and on commodity councils in supply 
chain considerations during the design phase. Logistics representatives 
could work with acquisition personnel to minimize the number of low-
demand parts as part of the plan for long-term parts support as early as 
possible in the product cycle. Early involvement of logistics buyers can 
also help ensure greater consideration for supply chain issues through-
out a product’s life cycle.
Phase II: Production
The leverage the Air Force has over suppliers regarding supply issues 
for low-demand (and other) items likely peaks just before award of the 
production contract, when competition still exists and OEMs are more 
likely to agree to terms favorable to the Air Force. Including support 
language in the production contract can help align supplier incentives 
with Air Force goals and make commitment to them more likely to be 
honored. The time before the production contract has been awarded is 
also the best time for the Air Force to negotiate ownership of techni-
cal data that could prove helpful in developing alternative sources of 
supply (Solis, 2006). 
The Air Force should require suppliers to address low-demand 
parts support during production (and hence the first stages of the after-
market), when problems are easier to address than they are in post- 
production when lower-tier suppliers may have quit the business and 
parts become more costly to support. Managing low-demand parts 
support during production should also address access to technical data 
and special tooling while both remain available with manufacturers. 
Private-sector companies that link support of low-demand parts to 
production contracts write two separate contracts: one for aftermar-
ket support and another for production. The aftermarket support con-
Conclusions    73
tract establishes terms and conditions and rules for supplying the parts 
during and after production. 
Phase III: Postproduction
Many legacy systems are no longer in production and hence Air Force 
options for developing supply strategies for them are limited. The Air 
Force through its commodity councils needs to analyze comprehen-
sively its low-demand parts to determine how to aggregate parts into 
more attractive packages for its suppliers. It can develop supply strate-
gies for groups of requirements sharing similar technologies or pro-
cesses, requiring certain skills, or still other similarities. Larger, related 
groups of requirements can increase Air Force leverage and encourage 
suppliers to remain in business longer.
Air Force analyses of low-demand parts can also identify what 
leverage it has with specific suppliers. If the Air Force has a relatively 
low volume of business with a supplier and cannot give it other incen-
tives to support its parts, then it may need to pay a premium price to 
ensure long-term supplies. Other, less desirable options include end-of-
life purchases of parts and cannibalizing whole products.
Other Considerations
In assessing supply strategies for low-demand parts, the Air Force must 
consider many conditions that differ from those in the private sector. 
For example, the Air Force has many legacy or out-of-production air-
craft systems with established OEMs, limiting its ability to apply best 
practices for developing supply strategies for low-demand parts. Many 
of its low-demand parts are sole source. The market for defense sys-
tems has consolidated over the past years, resulting in fewer compa-
nies. Having fewer suppliers limits the ability of the Air Force to deny 
new business to suppliers that have performed poorly with low-demand 
parts. The development and acquisition of weapon systems in separate 
programs also make it difficult to achieve parts standardization and 
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commonality. Finally, Air Force acquisition and sustainment organi-
zations are not integrated, making it difficult to include postproduc-
tion support in the production contract, although the Integrated Life 
Cycle Management framework is seeking to include more consider-
ation of logistics support of service parts in production contract lan-
guage (Donley, 2009).
The source of greatest leverage in relationships the Air Force has 
with its suppliers may shift as a product moves through its life cycle. 
For some aftermarket parts that are purchased directly from tier-one 
or below suppliers, for example, DLA might have greater leverage with 
certain suppliers. The Air Force might need to find new ways to main-
tain relationships with its key suppliers of low-demand parts by adding 
low-demand parts support to its supplier relationship management dis-
cussions and summits with DLA and common key suppliers for legacy 
systems.1 For new and upgraded systems, it should also be working on 
developing proactive strategies for securing supplies with its sustain-
ment and acquisition communities.
Best commercial practices for low-demand service parts can sup-
port goals to increase aircraft availability rates by developing proac-
tive supply strategies for increasing the availability of parts. They can 
also help AFMC meet its purchasing and supply chain management 
goals to reduce total sourcing cycle time, increase material supply avail-
ability, and reduce material purchase and repair costs. In sum, they 
can help the Air Force boost aircraft availability while simultaneously 
decreasing overall support costs. 
1 The Air Force has greater leverage with its OEMs through its large acquisition programs, 
product support, and CLS and PBL contracts. 
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Construction of the Data Samples
Requisitions
Requisition data record Air Force unit orders for parts to be provided 
at the wholesale depot level. Our requisitions data span nearly three 
years, from FY 2002 through FY 2004. After deleting observations 
without a NIIN and those that were duplicate records based on unique 
combinations of the document number, NIIN, fiscal year, and the req-
uisition quantity, our sample is reduced to 2,020,824 requisitions for 
56,186 NIINs.1 We use the number of requisitions for each NIIN from 
FY 2002 to FY 2004 as the basis for defining low-demand parts.
MICAPs
Our MICAP incidents data span nearly six years: October 1998 to April 
2005. A MICAP incident is one occurrence of a MICAP. MICAPs are 
recorded at the NIIN level. The format of the available MICAP data 
changed over this period. The data through FY 2003 had one record 
1 The requisitions data also include information on the price of the units requisitioned. 
Unfortunately, the price information is poorly coded in the requisitions data, with many 
obvious cases in which the contract price is off by either a factor of 100 or 0.01. This was 
apparent from the price for the same NIIN often being 100 times or one-hundredth that of 
the price for that NIIN from a separate order. While we can fix some of these price discrep-
ancies, we are probably not capturing all of the cases of an incorrect price, as some cases are 
ambiguous as to whether the original data are correct. Thus, the price data are not useful 
without first cleansing for errors, which was beyond the scope of this study. 
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per month for a given MICAP incident (or “document number”). A 
MICAP incident could have more than one record if the incident was 
not resolved (a part became available) within the month the MICAP 
incident occurred. There are likely cases where the incident was not 
properly coded as resolved, resulting in the creation of multiple records 
that appeared again in the database, because they were considered still 
“open” or “unresolved.” Each record has an “advice code” that indicates 
whether the MICAP incident was starting, stopped, transferred from 
one end item to another, or several other choices. However, the “advice 
code” was missing for about one-third of the observations.
Starting with 3,014,476 MICAP records, we assumed that all 
observations with a MICAP that has lasted more than six months (spe-
cifically, 183 days or 4,392 hours) were not coded properly as having 
been resolved. While we may be deleting valid MICAP observations, 
we hypothesize that we are primarily deleting resolved MICAPs. These 
deletions did not affect the analyses described in this monograph, 
other than that for a comparison of MICAP hours, because we mostly 
considered only MICAP incidents, not duration. This “cut-off” rule 
of allowing no MICAP durations greater than six months led us to 
delete about 1.6 percent of the observations, leaving 2,966,199 MICAP 
records. Next, for unique combination of document number, NIIN, 
and quantity, we retained only the MICAP observation with the high-
est number of MICAP hours that had an advice code of “Z,” which 
indicates MICAP completion. If MICAP observations for a given 
combination of document number, NIIN, and quantity did not have 
an advice code of “Z,” then we took the observation with the highest 
number of MICAP hours because this was more likely to be the latest 
observation. However, some of these may be “runaway” MICAP obser-
vations that had already been resolved. These criteria left one observa-
tion per MICAP incident, or 2,255,922 MICAP incidents. These data 
steps resulted in over two million MICAP incidents in our final sample 
for 228,389 different NIINs.
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AWP
We analyzed AWP incidents for the period March 2002 to May 2004. 
Some AWP incidents also have more than one observation. We started 
with 799,217 records. We excluded observations that had the calcu-
lated number of days for the AWP incident exceeding six months (spe-
cifically, 183 days). This deleted about 5.5 percent of the observations, 
bringing our total to 755,153 observations. We then took the observa-
tion for a given combination of document number, NIIN, and quan-
tity that had the highest number of AWP days. This left 393,797 obser-
vations (representing one observation for every incident) for the final 
sample for 45,212 different NIINs.
Spend for Air Force-Managed NIINs
We extracted the contract data from the Strategic Sourcing Analyisis 
Tool in GCSS-AF. These data represented purchases the Air Force 
made for Air Force–managed NIINs between October 1, 2000, and 
September 30, 2003, or FY 2001 to FY 2003. We used these data to 
analyze low-demand parts spend. 
We initially had 91,637 observations for contracts from “repairs” 
and 38,626 observations from contracts for “spares.” Each observation 
represents a contract transaction, as some contracts have more than one 
transaction. We deleted observations with a zero or missing contract 
price amount or with a missing contract number, which left 71,900 
repair and 33,192 spare transactions, or 105,093 total contract transac-
tions. Deleting observations with blank contract numbers reduced the 
number of observations for repairs to 35,014, or 68,268 total contract 
transactions. This did not affect the number of spares observations.
Consolidating the 68,268 transactions into contracts produces 
23,204 total contracts and 19,011 different NIINs. Of these, 65 per-
cent had only one transaction, while 8 percent had more than 5 trans-
actions and 32 contracts had more than 100 transactions.
Each contract transaction contains the NIIN, the dollar value, 
the quantity of items being supplied, the unit price, and whether that 
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transaction was sole source. Interestingly, there are many cases where 
contracts had both sole-source and non-sole-source transactions.2 We 
used the low-demand items identified in the requisition data analysis 
to define low-demand items in the contract data. We identified low-
demand contract transactions.
We inflate the FY 2001 and FY 2002 contract values so that 
they are in FY 2003 dollars.3 Altogether, the contract data represent 
$11.7 billion of item purchases, in FY 2003 dollars.
Table A.1 










53 hardware and abrasives 25.4
59 electrical and electronic equipment components 22.7
15 aircraft and airframe structural components 16.7
16 aircraft components and accessories 5.4
61 electric wire, and power and distribution equipment 4.7
others 25.1
Table A.2 










59 electrical and electronic equipment components 33.9
53 hardware and abrasives 17.8
16 aircraft components and accessories 14.3
15 aircraft and airframe structural components 7.1
29 engine accessories 4.6
others 22.3
2 A contract is determined to be “sole source” if the AMC code has the value of 3, 4, or 5.
3 For putting the contract values in constant dollars, we use the Consumer Price Index 
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